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This thesis looks comparatively at the social and iritra-military 
conditions that have led to coups d'etat in other countries, in order to 
evaluate whether a coup d'etat could occur in the United States. This 
thesis also creates a fictional scenario for this possibility to demonstrate 
that this phenomenon is not isolated to developing and economically 
backward nations. The thesis argues not that a coup will actually occur 
in the United States, but that the U.S. system of civil-military relations 
has been neglected and may need reform to meet the needs of the United 
States as a superpower. Supporting research covers the history of U.S. 
civil-military relations, current problems in. U.S. civil-military affairs, 
and theoretical causes of coups. It concludes that there currently is not 
a risk of a coup d'etat in the United States but that it may become 
possible in the future. 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Despite the prevalence of the coup d'etat and the widely distributed 
types of government that are susceptible to this event, there is an almost 
dogmatic belief that the United States will never experience a military 
takeover. Even the recent fear of a "crisis" in U.S. civil-military relations 
is not familiar to the public, the vast majority of the military or the 
government. Theories on coups d'etat and civil-military relations 
encourage this sense of invulnerability in the United States. Some 
theorists state explicitly that the United States, with its form of 
democracy, is immune to the phenomenon. 
The United States supposedly possesses the archetypical form of 
. government and society to prevent coups. Significant changes in the 
structure and mission of the military leads some experts to believe that 
the current system of civil-military relations must be overhauled to meet 
current needs before it collapses. The most important issue that needs to 
be addressed is whether changes have made it possible for a coup d'etat 
to occur in the United States. What are the factors that would make an 
officer or groupo~ officers in the U.S. military decide to take such a 
dangerous and irregular course of action? 
Chapter I presents the relevance and background for the thesis. 
Chapter II will cover the development of both the U.S. model of civil-
military relations and the concept of civilian control of the military. This 
discussion will indicate the changes that have occurred in our histo:ry 
ix 
and how they affect present civil-military relations. Historical analysis 
will also provide the background for discussion of present problems in 
U.S. civil-military relations. 
Current problems will be detailed and analyzed in Chapter III to 
determine if there are signs of a present or impending crisis which could 
create conditions that make a coup possible. Chapter IV will provide 
supporting research covering the theories on the occurrence of coups 
d'etat to define these conditions. It will lay out the reasons behind a 
military's decision to seize power. The final task, in Chapter V, will be to 
create a scenario based on the research findings. 
The goal of this research and the creation of the fictional scenario 
is not to prove that the United States will experience a coup. It is 
designed to bring more attention to the subject of U.S. civil-military 
relations and the dangers of military intervention into politics. A 
historical review of U.S. civil-military relations shows that present 
military requirements do not conform with historical desires of the 
American public. A nation traditionally wary of large or standing 
militaries was forced into a world leadership role with extensive military 
needs. The original system of civil-military relations is strained by the 
new conditions. There are many who argue that there is a crisis in civil-
military relations. 
This thesis argues that there is not a crisis in U.S. civil-military 
relations if a crisis is defined as direct military challenge to civilian 
authority. Problems that exist result from the changing world 
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environment that forced the United States into its present role as a 
superpower. A professional militruy forced into political activism by the 
security needs of the nation and its own corporate interests has become 
separated from the political, civilian leadership. There will be continuing 
conflict between the militruy and the civilians over national policy and 
security issues as perceptions and goals diverge. With proper study and 
attention, these changes can be adjusted for in our civil-militruy 
relations without the loss of civilian control. 
There are two issues that should be more carefully researched since 
they would be the most likely causes of a coup d'etat in the United 
States. The first issue is to determine factors that would cause the U.S. 
militruy to become further isolated from mainstream society in thought 
but more powerful in political and domestic influence. The second issue 
is to understand the conditions that could create a sense of danger 
within the U.S. military. 
Further understanding of these two issues will allow the educated 
and effective revision of our system of civil-militruy relations. A more 
effective system will make the possibility of a coup d'etat, or any other 
form of militruy intervention, even less probable. Finally, a revised 
system of civil-militruy relations can lessen the conflicts between civilian 
and militruy leadership and thus increase effectiveness of defense and 
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There is a danger that can dismantle superpowers (Goble, 
1996;Dobbs, 1991, pA01) and defeat the efforts of nations to attain 
economic and political health. It is not an attack from without but an 
enemy from within, the coup d'etat. The Soviet Union crumbled into the 
Russian Federation after a coup d'etat in August 1991 and suffered 
another one in 1993. As recently as October 1996, there were reports of 
plans for a coup in Russia. (McCuny, 1996) The last remnant of the Cold 
War could become a shooting war for the United States if North Korea 
succumbs to a coup d'etat that places the military in power. South 
Korea, an important U.S. ally is facing the results of a successful coup in 
1980 and U.S. forces actively participated in the defense of the existing 
government in the Philippines in 1989. Danger of coups in Asia is 
heightened by succession issues in North Korea and the People's 
Republic of China, who many believe will be the next superpower. 
The coup d'etat is also a prevalent incident worldwide. It happens 
often in Central and South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle 
East, and Southeast Asia and has occurred in Northeast Asia, Europe, 
and Russia. The first four regions change governments through coups 
more often than through legal means. (O'Kane, 1987, p141; Zimmerman, 
1979, p391) There are also more people, worldwide, who live under the 
rule of governments established through coups than through elections. 
(Luttwak, 1979, p9) Population trends in these countries make this 
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applicable to the present. Coups d'etat are also not confined to 
undeveloped or third-world nations. France, a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council, experienced a coup in 1958. Some 
other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Greece 
and Turkey, experienced multiple coups in the 1960s,1970s, and up to 
1980. (O'Kane, 1987, pp141-143; Luttwak, 1979, p32). 
Despite the prevalence of the coup d'etat and the widely distributed 
types of government that are susceptible to this event, there is an almost 
dogmatic belief that the United States will never experience a military 
takeover. Except for interdisciplinary debates on issues affecting civil-
military relations, there has been a historical lack of concem for this 
possibility. Even the recent fear of a "crisis" in U.S. civil-military 
relations (Snider and Carlton-Carew, 1995, p1) is not familiar to the 
public or the vast majority of the military or the government. Theories on 
coups d'etat and civil-military relations encourage this sense of 
invulnerability for the United States. Some theorists state explicitly that 
the United States, with its form of democracy, is immune to the 
phenomenon. The United States supposedly has the archetypical form of 
government and society to prevent coups (Finer (1962), 1988, p79, 131-
132). 
The form of the U.S. Government and the U.S. constitutional 
establishment of civilian control over the military are touted as the 
reasons that coups have not occurred in the United States. The 
Founding Fathers applied lessons learned from growing pains of 
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European nations when they created the Constitution, but their efforts 
were not directed at preventing a coup d'etat. (Cullop, 1984, p15) Civil-
military relations have not been a problem for the United States as she 
has grown from a collection of rebellious colonies into a superpower due 
more to luck than planning. Despite greatly changed military needs and 
the accompanying tensions in civil-military relations, the armed forces of 
the United States have exhibited only isolated and limited defiance of 
their civilian leaders. Significant changes in the structure and mission of 
the military leads some experts to believe that the current system of 
civil-military relations must be overhauled to meet current needs before 
it collapses. 
The most important issue that needs to be addressed is whether 
changes have made it possible for a coup d'etat to occur in the United 
States. The undertaking is illegal, irregular, and unpredictable. There are 
no chances to back down and failure carries very high penalties, 
including death. (Horowitz, 1980, p xi) 
What are the factors that would make an officer or group of 
officers in the U.S. military decide to take such a dangerous and irregular 
course of action? Even if the needed conditions do not exist, efforts 
should be made to determine their possibility in order to prevent the 
conditions from developing. An even more important task to undertake, 
after the key factors are identified, is to create interest and debate on 
how to avoid these conditions from emerging within U.S. society and 
government. 
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The thesis will attempt to create a viable, fictional situation for a 
coup d'etat to occur in the United States. The scenario will be similar in 
format to the scenario create by Charles Dunlap in his article, The 
Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012. Background research is 
needed in three areas to support a credible event to serve as a polemic for 
further discussion. 
Chapter II will cover the development of both the U.S. model of 
civil-military relations and the concept of civilian control of the military. 
This discussion will indicate the changes that have occurred throughout 
U.S. histo:ry and how they affect present civil-military relations. These 
changes will be the development of a professional military, the increased 
influence of the milita:ry establishment within govemment, and the 
growth of an adversarial relationship between the military and the 
civilian leadership. Historical analysis will also provide the background 
for discussion of present problems in U.S. civil-military relations. 
Current problems will be detailed and analyzed in Chapter III to 
determine if there are signs of a present or impending crisis which could 
create conditions that make a coup possible. Chapter IV will provide 
supporting research covering the theories on the occurrence of coups 
d'etat to define these conditions. It will lay out the reasons behind a 
military's decision to seize power. The final task will be to create a 
scenario based on the research findings and conclusions. Chapter V will 
present this fictional sto:ry. 
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The goal of this research and the creation of the fictional scenario 
is not to prove that the United States will experience a coup. It is 
designed to bring more attention to the subject of U.S. civil-military 
relations and the dangers of military intervention into politics. An 
enhanced understanding of both civil-military relations and the coup 
phenomenon is the intended result of this thesis. Perhaps a wider 
understanding of both topics will make the United States more robust in 
efforts to prevent a coup from ever occurring here. 
5 
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U. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A coup d'etat in the United States would signal a failure of its 
system of civil-military relations. An analysis of the history of civil-
military relations within the United States will show what weaknesses 
exist or are developing in the system. Civilian control of the armed 
forces, the development of a professional military, and the changes in the 
U.S. world role have defined and have changed the relations between 
civilian leaders and the military. The method of civilian control of the 
military must also be reviewed. Samuel Huntington classifies the U.S. 
system as one relying on "subjective" vice "objective" control of the armed 
forces. (Huntington, 1985, pl63) Both types of control will be presented 
to point out strengths and weaknesses in our system. Points of 
vulnerability inherent in this relationship can result in change or failure. 
Historical research will also set the stage for evaluation of the current 
tensions in civil-military relations, which will be discussed in Chapter 
III. 
A. CONCEPT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Civilian control of the military, as we are used to in the United 
States, is dependent upon the idea of a professional military. A 
professional, as defined by Samuel Huntington, is someone who 
practices a vocation that requires special expertise, responsibility, and 
corporateness. The professional is an expert in his field and has 
achieved this level of skill through prolonged education and practice. 
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Historical knowledge is important. Continuing research of the militru:y 
arts and development of militru:y skills are required also. As a practicing 
expert with a monopoly of knowledge in his field, the professional must 
serve society with a sense of responsibility that goes beyond simple 
profit. Unity and shared consciousness exist among the members of a 
profession. This collective sense leads to formalization and 
standardization of competence in the field. Military officers are most 
effective in the field when their conduct approaches this idea of 
professionalism and avoids distractions in politics.(Huntington, 1985, 
p9-11) 
The U.S. military officer is a professional. Each officer possesses a 
near monopoly on the management of violence and is solely responsible 
for the conduct of warfare. Skill in management of violence is achieved 
through formal schooling and extensive experience. Society relies on the 
officer to use his skills for the common good and not for self-serving, 
particular ends. The military profession serves the state and its citizens 
by providing security. Commissions are required before an officer is given 
the right to practice his profession and entrance is limited and regulated. 
The militru:y officer worldwide, however, has not always been a 
professional (Huntington, 1985, pl9). 
The birth of the professional militru:y in the United States 
paralleled changes occurring in Europe in the nineteenth century. 
According to Huntington, prior to 1800, there was no professional officer 
corps anywhere in the world. Warfare was carried out by mercenaries and 
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aristocrats. Both types of officers served the needs of monarchs who 
needed to raise armies and then required standing armies. Officership 
was usually limited to those with wealth and influence. As a result, 
effectiveness and efficiency was limited until the birth of the military 
profession in the early 1800s (Huntington, 1985, p28). 
The Prussian military of the nineteenth century is credited with 
creating military professionalism in western societies. The increasing 
complexity of warfare, the developing technology, and the diversified 
manning of the armed forces required a more professional officer. The 
growth of the nation state as the unit of political power also served to 
professionalize the military. Nation states require permanent experts to 
provide military security. (Huntington, 1985, p32) The rise of democratic 
thinking opened the officer corps to all citizens, ending the domination 
of the officer corps by powerful but men with marginally military 
effectivness. Finally, the nation also gave the military forces a single 
focus of authority. The military was to serve the nation as an institution 
and other cleavages or political considerations became less important. 
(Huntington, 1985, p36) 
B. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 
1. Why Civilian Control? 
The professional military officer is the expert in the management of 
violence. He is not an expert on politics. Does this, however, imply that 
civilian leaders should have control over the armed forces? S.E. Finer 
says that 
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... there is a common assumption, an unreflected belief, that 
it is somehow 'natural' for the armed forces to obey civil 
power. But no reason is adduced for showing that civilian 
control of the armed forces is, in fact, 'natural'. Is it? 
Instead of asking why the militruy engage in politics, we 
ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first 
sight the political advantages of the militruy vis-a-vis other 
and civilian groups are overwhelming. The militruy possesses 
vastly superior organization. And they possess arms. (Finer 
(1962), 1988, p4) 
Clausewitz's theories on warfare provide the reason why the militruy 
should be subservient to the political leadership, but do not indicate how 
this is accomplished. According to Clausewitz, war is only justified when 
it serves a public purpose and is not an end in itself. War is subordinate 
to political ends and the extent and violence of war is bounded by these 
goals. He states that " ... War is only a part of political intercourse, 
therefore by no means an independent thing in itself." (Clausewitz, 1832, 
p402) 
The fact that war is a science assigns a role to the professional 
officer. Expertise is judged by the fighting ability of the armed forces and 
not by the nature of the cause for which they are fighting. The ends of 
the war are, therefore, outside the officer's responsibility and expertise. 
Since warfare should be subservient to the political goals of a nation, the 
soldier should be subservient to the statesman. (Huntington, 1985, p57) 
Clausewitz, therefore, provided a model of warfare which also justified 
civilian control over the armed forces. 
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The development of a professional milita.Iy also created a set of 
ideas that were uniquely military. Achieving civilian control of the 
military requires that conflicts between these military beliefs and those 
of the society are controlled or minimized. The military ethic wishes to 
compensate for the shortcomings of human nature such as evil, 
irrationality, and weakness. It stresses the supremacy of the collective 
over the individual and the need for order, hierarchy, and obedience. War 
is an inescapable threat to the nation and power is the only effective 
means of providing security for the state. Military minds shun risk and 
overcommitment. Overall, it is 
... pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-
oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist,and 
instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in 
short, realistic and conservative. (Huntington, 1985, p79) 
There are many ways that this military ethic could bring the 
military into conflict with its civilian leaders. Obedience to civilian 
orders could conflict with military expertise if officers see the orders as 
counterproductive or dangerous. Conflict could also arise if the orders 
are perceived to be counter to the common values of society or are 
deemed illegal. 
2. Subjective Versus Objective Control 
Huntington defines two methods by which civilian superiority over 
the military can be achieved. These means are subjective and objective 
civilian control. Subjective civilian control maximizes civilian power and 
objective control maximizes military professionalism. Both forms of 
11 
control rely on the power of civilian groups being greater than the power 
of military groups. 
Subjective control maximizes the power of a given civilian group so 
that its power is greater than the military's power. The civilian groups are 
continually in conflict or competition with each other, so subjective 
control also enhances the power of one civilian group over other civilian 
groups. Therefore, the group that exercises civilian control differs from 
nation to nation. Subjective control is accomplished by " ... maximizing 
particular government institutions, particular social classes, and 
particular constitutional forms."(Huntington, 1985, p81) It " ... achieves 
its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state 
(Huntington, 1985, p83)." 
Governmental institutions that compete for power also compete for 
the right to exercise civilian control of the military. In the United States, 
the Legislative and Executive branches of government compete for 
influence and each argues that it is the proper executor of civilian 
control. Class struggles for influence can also use the issue of civilian 
control but they are not used for this purpose in the United States. A 
specific form of govemment or constitutional form can also be touted as 
the means of ensuring civilian control. Again, this is a competition 
between groups supporting different styles of government, with the 
winner gaining the right to exercise civilian control. A democratic form of 
government is believed to be the best for this purpose in the United 
States, but U.S. histo:ry has shown that this is not the only form of 
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government which can limit rnilita.Iy power. Totalitarian states including 
Germany during the Second World War, are examples of non-democratic 
states where military political power was almost nonexistent. 
(Huntington, 1985, p82) 
The professionalization of the armed forces complicated subjective 
control. The civilian groups were faced with an independent and unified 
group which is also competing for power and is no longer simply the tool 
of power struggles. The military's goals would have to be changed or 
denied for subjective control to remain possible because the concept of 
civilian control was no longer monopolized by a given civilian group. 
Huntington states that the subjective control is obsolete and that 
objective control is the only means of ensuring civilian authority. 
(Huntington, 1985, p83) 
Objective control differs from subjective control because it relies on 
the distribution of power between military and civilian groups. Proper 
distribution will enhance professional behavior and attitude in the officer 
corps. It " ... achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the 
tool of the state." (Huntington, 1985, p83) Military power is minimized by 
" ... professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and 
neutral." (Huntington, 1985, p84) The military officer stands ready to use 
his skills to defend the interests of his country, but leaves the definition 
of these interests to the political leaders. Huntington argues that 
objective control is superior to subjective control because there is not a 
conflict between the maximization of civilian control and maximization 
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of military security which exists in subjective control. A greater threat to 
national security would not cause an erosion of civilian control. 
Although objective control is preferable, the United States has not 
achieved this type of civilian control. The reliance on subjective control 
has its roots in American history. 
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS BEFORE THE COLD WAR 
1. Prior to the Civil War 
Civilian control of the military has been important to the leaders 
of the United States since the founding of the country. (Libby, 1992) 
The Founding Fathers were wary of standing forces, however, they did not 
fear or predict the emergence of a professional military and the problems 
this would create for civil-military relations. The military was composed 
of citizen-soldiers whose ideas would be in agreement with those of the 
civilian leadership despite having commanded forces within the armed 
forces. (Johnson, 1995) Thomas Jefferson was more concerned with 
civilian groups using the military for their own ends than with the 
possibility that the military would seek power for itself. George 
Washington warned in his farewell speech for the United States to 
... avoid the necessity of those overgrown military 
establishments, which, under any form of government, are 
inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as 
particularly hostile to Republican Liberty. (Washington, 
1796) 
The U.S. Constitution was written to provide civilian control of the 
military and for the maintenance of a balanced distribution of this 
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power. The President serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the anned 
forces while the Congress controls the funding for the military and the 
right to declare war. Congress is only authorized to appropriate funds for 
the Army for a period of two years. (Cullop, 1984, p104-108) This 
limitation was designed to ensure that there was public discourse and 
scrutiny of military policy and manning. (Libby, 1992) The United States, 
therefore, mobilized troops as needed and then demobilized troops after a 
conflict was concluded. 
Distrust of and lack of need for standing armies prevented the 
development of a professional military prior to the Civil War. " ... [T]he 
notion of a uniquely military perspective on policy and strategy had not 
been fully formed." (Johnson, 1995) 
From Major General Alexander Hamilton as Inspector 
General and principle architect of the Army during its first 
major expansion under the Constitution, during the Quasi 
War with France of 1798-1800--even from Lieutenant 
General George Washington as Commanding General during 
the Quasi War, the principal officers had moved back and 
forth between officership and politics. (Weigley, 1993, p36) 
Even during the Civil War many generals from on both sides had 
credentials for command based on political position rather than on 
military leadership skills. (Johnson, 1995) 
2. Changes Caused by the Civil War 
The expansion of the U.S. Army into the approximation of a nation 
in anns, during the Civil War, created the corporateness needed for 
professionalism. The confidence, maturity, and autonomy gained through 
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this war gave the officers an identity apart from civilians. There also 
emerged a sense of social responsibility, an essential part of the 
definition of professional. (Weigley, 1993, p37) 
Military officers after the Civil War were still in full support of 
civilian supremacy and sought to protect this belief by becoming 
politically isolated. Political participation was seen by the military as 
incompatible with military professionalism, therefore, it implemented a 
self-imposed isolation. (Johnson, 1995) The military establishment 
devoted its efforts toward the sole end of combat effectiveness and the 
science of combat. The academies instilled within the midshipmen and 
cadets a sense of contempt for politics and its dishonest practitioners 
(Huntington, 1985, p259). 
Lincoln's detailed involvement in the war did not cause the 
resentment that presidential control would engender during the Vietnam 
War. This was fortunate for civilian authority. Weigley argues that 
Lincoln's ideas about how the war should be fought coincided with those 
of his generals as the war progressed. McClellan believed in a manner of 
warfare which would not embitter the South and make reunification 
more difficult. By the time General Grant took over as General-in-Chief, 
Lincoln had decided that victory could only be achieved by the complete 
destruction of the Confederate military. Grant had embraced this style of 
warfare before he took command, as did his second-in-command, General 
Sherman. This fortunate agreement on strategic objectives foreshadowed 
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the tradition of civil-military affairs which would last for more than 
eighty years. (Weigley, 1993, p39) 
3. From the Civil War to the Second World War 
Peaceful years and unchallenged security left the concept of miliary 
subordination untested. Military power was relatively unimportant to 
American interests so military involvement in strategy was not needed. 
(Johnson, 1995) The Spanish-American War of 1898 showed the 
acceptance of the status-quo in civil-military relations as President 
McKinley actively directed the war. Again, during the campaigns against 
Mexico in 1916-17, a President took minute control of the Anny. 
President Wilson's changing political goals during the conflict led to its 
failure and to the possible destruction of General Pershing's career. 
Pershing nevertheless performed quietly and without 
compliant, doing as he was told and setting an example of 
tight lipped conformity to the orders of the civilian 
Commander-in-Chief under exceptionally exasperating 
conditions. (Weigley, 1993, p40) 
According to Weigley, fortune again protected civilian supremacy as 
the United States entered the World War in 1917. President Wilson, who 
restrained military actions to serve narrowly defined goals in the Mexican 
conflict, now decided to commit the United States completely. Free reign 
was given to the military which was allowed to wage the war at its 
discretion. Since this autonomy, which greatly limited the President's 
role, was given to General Pershing and not seized, civil supremacy was, 
again, not tested. After the First World War, military respect for civilian 
authority continued to grow. This respect reached its zenith immediately 
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prior to the Second World War and, as argued by Weigley, was even 
viewed later as excessive (Weigley, 1993, p41). 
Shadows of doubt were cast on the continuance of respect for 
civilian authority as plans were studied for the possible defense of the 
Philippines and actions against Japan. The armed forces saw the islands 
as indefensible, but the government had vowed to protect the Philippines. 
Both the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations 
believed it was dangerous to fight Japan while Germany remained a 
threat. Despite the danger, neither man warned the President because 
they did not want to appear to challenge policy or participate in political 
decision making (Weigley, 1993, p42). The fear of impropriety led to a 
costly defeat in the Philippines after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
led to open war and demonstrated a failure of the civil-military system. 
Relations between the civilian and military leaders changed after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor forced the United States into the 
war. The heads of the military branches were forced to make candid and 
numerous recommendation to the President and could no longer remain 
aloof from strategic decision making. Disagreements arose over the 
diversion of resources to the Nationalist Government in China and the 
decision to delay an invasion of Europe in order to attack the Magreb. 
Both operation diverted men and supplies from operations deemed more 
crucial by the military. 
Wartime mobilization efforts also threatened to undermine 
cooperation between civilian and military leaders, Weigley states. 
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Business leaders were allowed to direct the economic and industrial 
mobilization and they chose to conduct business as usual. The situation 
that developed was similar to the economic mobilization of the First 
World War. The world's largest economy, again, was unable to provide a 
superior supply of war material to the armed forces. U.S. forces were not 
equipped with superior arms or sufficient amounts of ammunition 
despite the wealth of the nation. (Weigley, 1993, p50) 
There were also shortfalls in manpower. Increasing manpower was 
required to maintain the economy during the mobilization and the armed 
forces were asked to scale down their manning to support this need. 
American Army divisions were, therefore, so few in number that it was 
impossible to rotate them out of the war. American ground forces, thus, 
were spread dangerously thin and combat effectiveness fell as fatigue 
mounted and divisional manning suffered from casualties. (Weigley, 
1993, p52) 
Due to either 
... remarkably silent military acquiescence in numerous 
civilian decisions that threatened the effectiveness of 
strategy and operations, ... (Weigley, 1993, p43) 
or because of the willing abandonment of strategic decision by the 
civilian leaders (Huntington, 1985, p317), military and civilian leaders 
continued to cooperate. There were many reasons for the military to 
challenge civilian leadership since the military and especially the Army 
was forced to fight a war without desired levels of support. The military 
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conducted itself according to traditions established during the Civil War 
and remained professional. Civil-military relations again avoided a test. 
D. COLD WAR DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN SUPREMACY 
Victory in the Second World War, ironically, marked the end of 
silent military acceptance of civilian supremacy. The U.S. anned forces 
abandoned its self-imposed isolation from policy and strategy issues. 
This triggered, within society, a renewal of the belief that military 
influence in these areas was inherently dangerous and a threat to 
democratic values. (Johnson, 1995) 
The Cold War forced the United States to maintain a large military 
force and defense budget and also led to a high number of decisions that 
required military input. Cold War decisions often intersected the 
political, diplomatic, and strategic realms. Some felt that the familiarity 
and constant interaction eroded the respect that had previously led to 
military self-deprecation.(Weigley, 1993, p56) The risk of escalation of 
conflicts into nuclear war blurred the distinction between military and 
political decisions. "U.S. national security strategy was forced to become 
holistic, making a clear delineation of functions and responsibilities 
difficult (Johnson, 1995)." 
Cold War security requirements forced changes to occur in the 
military organization. The National Security Act of 194 7 was designed to 
maintain effective civilian control over a larger anned force while 
improving the ability for the military to provide advice to statesmen. The 
law created the Department of Defense to improve interservice 
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cooperation and provided for a civilian to head this department. To 
further ensure that military influence in this position was limited, the 
President was to nominate a candidate who would then have to be 
confirmed by the Senate. The candidate was also prohibited from having 
served as a military officer for a minimum of ten years prior to his 
nomination. The Secretary of Defense was given the authority to control 
all facets of the military services pertaining to policy, budgets, programs, 
and even operations. The Secretary of Defense was also placed in the 
direct chain-of-command between the President and the Unified and 
Specified Commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Chairman 
of the JCS were purposely excluded from the chain-of-command because 
of their initial non-operational roles. Many important positions within 
the defense establishment were also ordered by law to be filled by 
civilians. These positions include the deputy secretary, the under 
secretaries, and assistant secretaries of defense. (Libby, 1992) With this 
legislation " ... a tenuous equilibrium was reached between the desire to 
limit military influence and the need for it." (Johnson, 1995) This Act 
was unable to prevent further erosion of civil-military relations. The 
respite from serious challenge enjoyed by the system of civilian 
supremacy had ended. 
Civil-military relations were severely tested by the Korean War and 
the Vietnam War. Civilian leaders saw the military's insistence on 
fighting a full-scale war as risky and irresponsible in the nuclear age. 
General MacArthur's conflict with President Truman over the extent of 
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the Korean War " ... precipitated one of the most serious civil-military 
crises in U.S. history." (Johnson, 1995) In Vietnam the military chafed at 
fighting a war under policy restraints that they felt prevented victory and 
cost lives unnecessarily. (Weigley, 1995, p56) Civilian policy makers were 
frustrated with an Army that insisted on fighting a conventional war 
against a foe who was employing a Marxist people's war. (Johnson, 1995) 
The competition between different branches of the armed forces has 
been used by civilian leaders to lessen the overall political power of the 
military. Disputes between the services over weapons systems and other 
budgetary matters divided the services. President Eisenhower was able to 
use this division to blunt the military's opposition to his security 
strategy of "massive retaliation." The Army opposed this strategy and the 
Navy and Air Force supported it because of the technical weapons 
systems that the Navy and Air Force hoped to gain. When President 
Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, took over, they 
introduced a program of managerial efficiency and operations research. 
McNamara also partially shifted the brainpower advantage away from the 
services by enlarging his staff. All the services were threatened by this 
shift of influence and by their lack of understanding of these new 
processes. (Johnson, 1995) They unified their opposition to these 
changes and the conduct of the Vietnam War. 
The combination of reduced miliary influence in government and 
reduced military control of warfighting became dangerous to civilian 
control. "In other countries, such a precipitous decline in the power and 
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autonomy of the military might have sparked a coup ... " (Johnson, 1995) 
Fortunately, the U.S. military fought back using calmer methods. The 
services began to work together to lessen the ability of civilians to play 
the services off against each other. A comprehensive plan was 
implemented to educate the officer corps on all aspects of congressional 
decision making and the budgetary process. Graduate education 
programs were expanded to increase the corporate knowledge within the 
military and to regain leverage. Political contacts in industry and 
Congress were developed and improved and an increased understanding 
of intemational relations and national security was nurtured at the war 
colleges. (Johnson, 1995) These initiatives reflected a drastic change in 
military thinking when compared to the Civil War period. 
The Cold War period also signaled the end of the traditional, 
citizen soldier. Deterrence required an "in place" military force instead of 
one that was designed to mobilize in times of crisis. Military service 
became less of an obligation to the country in a time of need and more 
like a regular job. Service in the armed forces was no longer a rite of 
passage and also lost its ability to compete with the higher standards of 
living available to the population. As a result of these changes, and a 
political need to demilitarize or de-mobilize at the close of the Vietnam 
War, conscription was ended. (Janowitz, 1979, pl71) On June 30, 1973, 
the U.S. military became an all voluntary force and changed civil-military 
relations. 
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The all-volunteer force introduced compositional changes within 
the military and a possible permanent shift in military corporate 
thought. The enlisted ranks of the armed forces began to show a trend 
toward a higher percentages of minorities than what existed in society. 
There was also a greater representation from the lower, and lower middle 
income levels of society in both the enlisted and officer ranks. The South 
and Southwest also provided a disproportionate number of officers. 
Additionally, the service academies classes began drawing more from the 
children of career military families as early as 1978. (Janowitz, 1979, 
p201) There was fear in the late seventies that such recruiting pattems 
would increase " ... the possibility of an officer corps that would become 
'isolated' from the larger society or, at the least, maintaining ve:ry 
specialized and narrow linkages with the civilian society." (Janowitz, 
1979, p191) 
The all-volunteer force transitional process heightened the siege 
mentality of the military. Those who volunteered perceived a lack of 
respect from the civilian elites and the press. Surveys showed that the 
general public had high confidence in the armed forces and that they 
agreed that the press had treated them unfairly. The high cost per-soldier 
of the all-volunteer force also increased government efforts to find ways 
of reducing costs. Prime targets included military retirement programs 
and entitlements. This also increased the military's fear and discontent 
with its civilian bosses. (Janowitz, 1979, p204) 
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E. POST COLD WAR PROBLEMS 
Motives for reform came from within the military as well as from 
Congress. Normal bureaucratic yearning for influence is cited as an 
intemal motive. The JCS may simply have sought greater ability to 
influence foreign policy relations. (Johnson, 1995) Some argue that 
... the Joint Chiefs campaigned consistently both to secure 
statutory authority for a military voice in deliberations on 
national policy and strategy, and through public 
pronouncements to influence policy-making in ways that will 
guard them against a repetition of waging war under the 
constraints against the application of overwhelming power 
that prevailed in Korea and Vietnam. (Weigley, 1993, p57) 
The need for reform was underscored by the failure of the Iranian hostage 
rescue operation known as "Desert One." President Carter overstepped 
the bounds of civilian involvement by taking personal control of many 
details of the operation. This deep involvement and the inability of the 
services to work together heightened calls for reform. 
Congress pushed for change from without. Unsatisfied with 
military adaptation to changing world condition, Congress wanted reform 
of defense operations, acquisitions, and planning capabilities. 
Congressional prerogatives culminated in the 1986 Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act sponsored by Republican Senator Barry 
Goldwater of Arizona and Democratic Congressman Bill Nichols of 
Alabama. This act, officially listed as Public Law 99-433, became known 
as the Goldwater-Nichols Act and is central to the discussion of the 
possible crisis in U.S. civil-military relations. 
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Subjective control of the military may be reaching the end of its 
usefulness . 
. . . it may be that Samuel Huntington was correct in his 
evaluation of the American variety of civil control of the 
military as a subjective civilian control, perilous because of a 
relative absence of objective institutional safeguards. 
(Weigley, 1993, p57) 
Americans can not rely on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to provide 
isolation. Economic ties and long range weapons have forced the United 
States to interact in the international community as a superpower. The 
mobilizing military has become a standing military with its own 
corporate interests and beliefs. These changes stress the conventions of 
U.S. civil-military relations which were established in vastly different 
conditions. 
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m. IS THERE A CRISIS IN U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS? 
Changing world and domestic conditions are challenging 
traditional implementation of civilian control over the military. Civil-
military relations may be changed to meet the challenge or may the 
United States may see a failure in its maintenance of civilian supremacy. 
Stresses are beginning to cause problems within the United States. These 
problems may indicate an existing or impending crisis in civil-military 
relations. A crisis will be defined as the loss of civilian control of the 
military. The following sections will present examples of tension between 
the armed forces and civilian leaders and argue whether they are a sign 
of a crisis. Though these examples show a negative trend in civil-military 
relations that may lead to crisis, they do not support the existence of a 
present crisis. 
A. RELEVANCE OF DISCUSSION 
There are many events which are cited as symptoms of a crisis in 
U.S. civil-military relations. Former Chairman of the JCS, Admiral 
William Crowe, using the prestige and influence of his recently vacated 
military position, publicly endorsed a presidential candidate and 
campaigned on his behalf. By proclaiming his support of candidate Bill 
Clinton in 1992, he violated the military's self-imposed tradition of 
isolation from active political participation. (Snider, 1995, p1) Another 
issue that caused more direct conflict between the military and the 
Congress was the debate on the role of women in combat. Amidst fervent 
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opposition from the military services, and the media noise over the 
Tailhook Scandal, Congress lifted the ban on women flying combat 
missions and serving aboard combatant naval vessels. The conflict 
escalated when the Clinton administration ordered all the military 
branches to increase the number of women in combat positions. The 
military protested publicly and used bureaucratic procedures to slow 
implementation of this order. (Snider, 1995, p 1) 
The third example is the contentious relationship between the 
armed forces and President Clinton. Senator Helms supported and voiced 
the military's feelings by making comments which proclaimed that the 
military would be actively antagonistic toward the President if he were to 
visit military installations. The final incident involved General Colin 
Powell and his actions while serving as the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS). 
He used the press to publicly debate the use of U.S. military forces in 
Bosnia and expressed public discontent with the lifting of the ban on 
homosexuals serving in the military. His actions were counter to the 
idea that civilian leaders should make political decisions with military 
advice and that the military's responsibility was to publically support 
and implement these decisions. (Snider, 1995, pp1-3) These incidents 
have led to the belief that there is a severe problem in civil-military 
affairs. 
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, is the focal point of those 
looking for the cause of the civil-military crisis. The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act increased the power of the military and threatened civilian 
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supremacy. (Johnson, 1995) Though the reforms implemented by the act 
were designed to increase effectiveness, they had the unintended effect of 
concentrating all the power of the military establishment and placing it 
in the hands of the CJCS. 
The scandal in question is nothing less than the collapse of 
civilian control over the military policies and military 
strategy of the United States. Without even the need of a 
coup d'etat, the power of decision that our civilian President 
is supposed to exercise ... has been seized by ... the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. (Luttwak, 1994) 
During Desert Storm, Snider argues, the CJCS was also able to 
circumvent laws that prevented him from having operational command of 
troops. The problems have not subsided and deserve additional attention 
(Snider, 1995, p3) 
Changing roles for the military are also cited as a possible cause 
for the strain in civil-military relations. These trends are 
1. Changes in the international system and, thus, in the 
U.S. strategic response 
2. The rapid drawdown of the military 
3. Domestic demands on the military and society's cultural 
imperatives 
4. The increased role of non-traditional missions for the 
military 
(Snider, 1995, p8) 
President Clinton's problems with the military, the effects of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, General Powell's role in the alleged crisis and the 
changing roles of the military will be examined will be examined in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
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B. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY PROBLEMS 
President Clinton entered office with a reputation as a draft dodger 
and as someone who had little understanding of, or need for, the 
military. There was wide dissemination of a letter he wrote to a Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) commander during the Vietnam war, in 
which he voiced sympathy for those that loved their country but hated 
the military.(Eitelberg, 1995, p49) His administrations relationship with 
the military started poorly and worsened. Several events underscored the 
lack of respect and, at times, open hostility of the armed forces toward 
the new President. The Commander-in-Chief was being challenged on his 
qualifications to command. Continuing problems indicate that severe 
strain exists in U.S. civil-military relations. 
While visiting the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, during 
his first visit to a military installation as Commander-in-Chief, he was 
greeted with catcalls and comments such as, "Maybe we can call this his 
military service, three hours is more than he had before." (Bacevich, 
1993) This occurred despite a preemptive visit by the Commander of the 
Atlantic Fleet and his orders to the personnel to be respectful toward the 
new President. This type of order should have been unnecessary. A 
Washington Post reporter covering the event wrote that there was a 
pervasive sense of mockery throughout the command with many jokes 
targeted at Hillary and Chelsea Clinton. 
The lack of mutual respect between the military and the Clinton 
administration was evident in the White House and at military 
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gatherings. A member of Clinton's staff refused to shake the hand of a 
highly decorated general and stated that she did not deal with or speak 
to anyone in uniform. The Pentagon leaked news of the incident to 
embarrass the President (Bacevich, 1993). During a White House party 
for the Democratic National Committee, high ranking military officers 
were instructed to carry trays of appetizers (Eitelberg, 1995, p49) 
The Air Force Chief of Staff issued an order to the entire U.S. Air 
Force, commanding them to respect the President and to behave 
accordingly. His success was no better than that of the Atlantic Fleet 
Commander. (Kohn, 1994, p3) During an Air Force unit's formal dinner, 
the guest speaker, a major general, criticized the President for smoking 
marijuana, draft dodging, and womanizing. The general,in tum, was 
relieved for his indiscretion. 
In a Washington Post editorial, two active service officers voiced 
their anger towards the President's intention to allow gays to serve 
openly in the military. They scolded the service chiefs for not being more 
strident and effective in their opposition to these plans. They then 
warned the President that a military officer was sworn to protect the 
Constitution and not the Commander-in-Chief. They were, in effect, 
telling the President that he had to earn their respect and loyalty. 
(Bacevich, 1993) 
A senior Congressman witnessed the antagonism while visiting the 
Army's Command and General Staff College. During a talk about the 
Congress' role and powers, he received repeated jeers. (Towers, 1994) 
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When he continued to lecture the class on the subject, catcalls replaced 
jeers, especially at any mention of the President. (Kohn, 1994, p3)) The 
increasingly partisan outlook of the military was shown during an award 
ceremony for Senator Strom Thurmond. The audience, made up of the 
Association of the United States Anny, applauded loudly when the 
speaker noted that the Senator had switched from the Democratic Party 
to the Republican Party in 1964. (Kohn, 1994, p3) 
A more severe test of civilian supremacy occurred as a result of the 
Tailhook Association scandal. When the investigation ended, Secretary of 
the Navy, John Dalton felt that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) had 
to be held accountable. When he asked for Admiral Kelso's resignation, 
the Admiral refused. The Secretary of Defense then supported the 
Admiral's position, citing the Admiral's support of the administrations 
policy on women in combat.(Bacevich, 1993) By his actions, the CNO 
was able to challenge civilian authority and create dissent among key 
civilian leaders in the Department of Defense. The military disaster in 
Somalia, where many special forces personnel were killed, was attributed 
to the Secretary of Defense's decision not to reinforce U.S. troops. 
Angered members of the military actively tried to undermine Les Aspin by 
offering a steady stream of rumors and press leaks to the Washington 
Times (Kohn, 1994, p3). 
Richard Kohn writes that 
The U.S. Military is now more alienated from its civilian 
leadership than at any time in American histo:ry, and more 
vocal about it. The warning signs are ve:ry clear, most 
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noticeably in the frequency with which officers have 
expressed disgust for the President over the last year. (Kohn, 
1994, p3) 
In response to this statement, one writer warns that the words "United 
States" and "American" in Kohn's statement could easily be replaced by 
Chile, South Mrica, or North Korea. These nations are known to have 
poor civil-military relations. It is very surprising and unpleasant that the 
statement applied so well to the United States. (Towers, 1994) 
Although the President is the target of military scom, he is not 
personally responsible for the changes which have occurred in civil-
military relations. He entered office after the end of the Cold War which 
signaled drastic changes in military doctrine. The military's influence and 
prestige, built up during the Cold War, were bolstered by success during 
the Desert Storm campaign. The most powerful and politically oriented 
military leader since the Second World War, General Colin Powell, was 
the CJCS, a position which itself was strengthened by the Goldwater-
Nichols Act. (Towers, 1994; Johnson, 1995) As the " .. .least experienced or 
interested Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. armed forces for at least 60 
years (Towers, 1994)," the President was severely disadvantaged. The 
hostility toward military matters expressed by members of his 
administration aggravated the problem. The military has also found an 
ally in a population that was disenchanted with politicians. The laws put 
in place by the Goldwater-Nichols Act also played a key role in enhancing 
the power of the military relative to the civilian leadership. The Act 
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influenced the Clinton Administration's civil-military relations by 
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consolidating and, thereby, enhancing the power of the senior military 
leader. 
President Clinton's problems with the military do not signify that 
he is the cause of tensions in civil-military relations. They are only a 
symptom of other changes which have placed stress on the system. Any 
president in his situation, faced with the increased political and legal 
power of the armed forces and declining military experience in the 
political leadership, would have faced similar problems. There will be 
presidents and administrations in the future which will face antagonism 
from the military because of these changes and the changing structure of 
U.S. society. 
C. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AND MILITARY POWER 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed in an environment of 
military opposition. Admiral Crowe was joined by Secretary of Defense 
Casper Weinberger in voicing concems over the strengthening of the 
CJCS. Desch argues that by naming the CJCS as the principle military 
advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the 
Secretary of Defense, the law dramatically increased military influence 
and challenged the civilian control achieved by Robert McNamara. "The 
military grew more unified and less amenable to civilian control. (Desch, 
1995, pl67)" 
John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy, responded to Richard 
Kohn's article "Out of Control, The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations" by 
writing, 
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Civilian control, as the term is generally understood and 
certainly as it was intended by the Founding Fathers, has 
been eliminated by years of well meaning reform legislation, 
culminating in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, drafted almost 
entirely by military staff officers from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the committee staffs. . .. In their understandable 
quest for efficiency, the military reformers have consolidated 
the power previously separated between the military 
departments, disenfranchised the civilian officials of each 
service, and created autocracy in the Joint Staff and 
arbitrary power in the person of the Chairman. (Powell, 
Lehman, Odom, Huntington, and Kohn, 1994, p24) 
Richard Kohn answered by supporting the call to enhance the power of, 
... the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which I believe 
needs to be strong in order to balance the service staffs and 
the Joint Staff, now so much more important after the 
Goldwater-Nichols law. (Powell et al, 1994, p30) 
Some argue that the Goldwater-Nichols Act was outdated when the Cold 
War ended. 
Goldwater-Nichols was a reform movements's attempt to 
build a military for long-term competition with th.e Soviet 
Union. The environment has changed, however, ... (Bracken, 
1995, p161) 
By making the CJCS an official member of the National Security 
Council, the Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the CJCS the right to give 
advice whenever he chose and not just when he was asked. This also 
signaled Congressional acceptance of the JCS belief that civilian 
interference had caused failed operations. (Johnson, 1995) Furthermore, 
the CJCS was no longer required to present a consensus view from the 
service chiefs. He was free to offer whatever advice he chose despite what 
the JCS believed. With personal control of the Joint Staff and with the 
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second-highest ranking officer in the military as his direct subordinate, 
the CJCS became more powerful. (Kohn, 1994, p9) 
As early as 1991, there were concerns over the possible rivahy 
which could develop between the chairman and the Secretary of Defense. 
The increasingly political nature of joint service positions could also 
reduce the promotion of those with operational experience in exchange 
for those with political savvy. This would make the military forces 
politically capable but hurt its combat abilities (Campbell, 1991). The 
Goldwater-Nichols may have improved planning for large, multi-service 
operations, but may, in the end, hurt the military and civil-military 
relations. 
General Powell used the power provided to him by the Goldwater-
Nichols act to win a war and then retired to civilian life. Wisdom, 
however, warns us that we cannot count on the good intentions of those 
we put in power. This leads us to be cautious and circumspect when 
assigning powers and establishing checks and balances. Colin Powell was 
able to overcome even the legal limitations of his power to wage an 
effective war. A future CJCS may not be motivated by such altruistic 
goals. Legislators and military leaders should be aware of the problems 
inherent in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
D. GENERAL COLIN POWELL/CAUSE OR EFFECT? 
The Cold War and the Goldwater-Nichols Act laid the foundation 
for military domination of strategic decision making and the lessening of 
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civilian control. The men who served as the Chairmen built upon this 
foundation. 
By the time Goldwater-Nichols was passed, civilian control 
had already been eroding, and though the Act certainly 
furthered the process, it was not fully consummated until 
the accession of General Colin Powell. (Luttwak, 1994) 
Admiral Crowe proceeded General Powell and laid the groundwork for 
General Powell so a short discussion is relevant. Crowe was the first 
CJCS to serve under the reorganized defense structure and did his part to 
increase military influence. He felt the CJCS was obligated to give overall 
advice and should not limit his advice to only distinctly military matters. 
He also believed that high ranking military officers should understand 
and influence Congressional politics, public affairs, and foreign affairs. 
Because of his beliefs, he supported the Goldwater-Nichols Act despite 
opposition from his boss and the separate service chiefs. 
Admiral Crowe's influence was different from that of General 
Powell, however, because he preferred to work behind the scenes. He was 
successful in playing off different civilian organizations and politicians 
against each other to get his way and even opened his own diplomatic 
channels with Soviet leaders. (Kohn, 1994, p8) General Powell was more 
outspoken and bold. 
General Powell effectively combined the legal power of his position 
with his own political skills to become " ... the.most influential JCS 
chairman in U.S. history," (Johnson, 1995) He became known as a 
political general who pushed the margins of military autonomy and 
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threatened civil-military relations. (Cohen, 1995) He became, not only 
the most popular military leader since Eisenhower, he also became the 
most political since MacArthur and the most powerful since Marshall. 
(Kohn, 1994, p9) He was therefore able to overrule the overmatched 
President Clinton on issues such as homosexuals in the military, 
military participation in the former Yugoslavia, and post-Cold War 
military budgets. (Luttwak, 1994) 
Scholars believe " .. .it was during (his) tenure that civilian control 
eroded most since the rise of the military establishment in the 1940s and 
1950s." (Kohn, 1994, p9;Johnson, 1995) It was the manner in which he 
used power, rather than his possession of power that seemed to threaten 
civilian supremacy. He chose to criticize and debate President Clinton's 
policy on homosexuals in the military in a very public manner, and, 
therefore, seemed to condone defiance from all ranks of the armed forces. 
Subordinates felt free to criticize and debate the issues. He also wrote an 
editorial in The New York Times which explained why the United States 
should avoid committing troops to Bosnia. In "Why General's Get 
Nervous," he chided those who would send military forces into Bosnia 
without clear goals. He cited President Bush as a president that 
understood the use of military force and implied that the Clinton 
Administration did not understand. (Powell, 1992) This open debate was 
also covered in the press by papers such as The Phoenix Gazette, again 
undermining Presidential prerogative. (Grady, 1995) 
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Richard Kohn argues that General Powell also took it upon himself 
to design a new, national security policy without consulting the JCS, the 
President, or the Secretary of Defense. Despite dissenting opinions from 
the Secretary of Defense, the Base Force Concept and a 25% reduction in 
force levels was presented to Congress, he actively campaigned for its 
approval. Kohn, who believes that there is a crisis, also argues that Gulf 
War planning and conduct was manipulated by General Powell to 
conform to his views on warfare. He effectively insulated the President 
from dissenting advice and made sure that all reports were channeled 
through him. By doing this, he had virtual operational control of the 
combatant commanders and violated the established chain-of-command 
that legally does not include the JCS or the CJCS. (Kohn, 1994, p10-13) 
General Powell answered critics in an article for the National 
Interest. He said that there was not a problem with civil-military 
relations during his tenure. Civilian control of him and his operations 
was effective and absolute under both Presidents, Bush and Clinton, and 
both Secretaries of Defense, Cheney and Aspin. He also noted that both 
Presidents expressed satisfaction with his performance and advice. 
According to the now retired Colin Powell, those looking for a crisis 
should tum elsewhere. (Powell, 1994, p23) His effect on civil-military 
relations would be important simply because of the debate and concern 
he seemed to have caused. 
As with the military problems faced by the Clinton Administration, 
Colin Powell's power was. a sign of structural changes and not due 
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exclusively to his political prowess. New legislation and growing 
acceptance of political behavior within the defense establishment made 
his expansive influence possible. If Colin Powell had not taken advantage 
of these possibilities, future military lea~ers would eventually have done 
so to their advantage. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act and General Powell's expansive powers 
have increased the military's influence, but they did not change the 
military's outlook. Changes in beliefs and goals are not brought about by 
legislation or the leadership of one man. These changes are brought 
about by changes in society. The demographic changes occurring in the 
United States are creating the conditions where a new "military thought" 
could develop. 
E. CHANGING ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ARMED FORCES 
The end of the Cold War and fading memories of the Desert Storm 
Campaign caused Americans to focus inward again. Historical lack of 
interest in international affairs and unwillingness to fund or tolerate 
large, standing militaries forced the downsizing of the armed forces. 
Some civilian and military leaders have increasingly offered military 
assets and personnel to perform more domestic missions and operations 
other than war (001W). These new tasks are changing the direction of 
military planning and training. Domestic issues are again the focus of 
the citizens while political leaders must face the problems of a mounting 
national deficit. Defense funding will necessarily fall, with competition 
for available budget dollars becoming more intense. Unfortunately, these 
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changes are placing a strain on the U.S. military at the same time that 
changing demographics have increased the power of other groups 
competing for funding and have decreased military experience within the 
government. 
1. Downsizing and Isolation 
America is using the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to 
return to a behavioral pattern that was prevented by our Cold War role 
as a superpower. A typical reaction to the conclusion of conflict was the 
response of the United States after the First World War. James F. 
Mcisaac and Naomi Verdugo quoted a passage from Walter Lippmann's 
U.S. Foreign Policy, Shield of the Republic, in their 1995 article. This 
quotation is a perfect description of U.S. tendencies. 
Unable to say who was friend or who was foe, who was our 
ally and who was our enemy, we had no practical measure of 
what was meant by the words "adequate national defense." 
Adequate against whom? Adequate with the help of whom? 
The word "adequate" had no meaning, and thus the real 
measure of our military preparation was not what would be 
needed to win a probable war but what Congress, belabored 
by the pacifists, militarists, the domestic pressure groups, 
and the taxpayers, agreed to appropriate money for. 
(Lippman, 1943, p70 quoted in Mcisaac, 1995, p21) 
America is again eager to reap the benefits of the "peace dividend." 
Many approaches were used to decrease military spending. 
Manning throughout all four services was reduced and U.S. force levels in 
Europe and Asia were decreased. The reduced manning requirements 
forced many officers out of the military service and prevented others from 
attaining career promotion goals. Infrastructure reductions were 
41 
controlled by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Committee. This 
committee asked the branches to decide which bases could be closed and 
which bases could be reconfigured to better serve military needs while 
reducing costs. 
Congress modified military recommendations based on strategic 
and tactical needs to meet political needs to distribute military contracts 
and programs throughout different constituencies. In the end, militacy 
leaders were even more disillusioned by political expedients which 
overrode expertise. The military forces started to became more centralized 
and insulated. They were centralized by the movement of most of our 
forces to the East and West Coasts of the United States. An example of 
this is the movement of most Navy facilities and commands to Norfolk, 
Virginia, and San Diego, California. Military forces became more isolated 
because fewer people in fewer areas of the nation would have contact 
with military personnel. As a result, less of the population would 
understand or have a stake in the armed forces. (Blazer, 1996, p1) 
The reduction in size also led the armed forces to reduce inputs to 
the officer corps from the different accession programs. ROTC commands 
located at U.S. universities and colleges provided fewer officers in 
proportion to the military academies. With fewer officers entering 
receiving commissions through these sources, a twenty year trend has 
become troubling. Since the end of conscription in 1973, the idea of the 
"citizen soldier" has died way. Once the backbone of our military 
tradition, officers and enlisted men drawn for short periods of time from 
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diverse civilian occupations are now a rarity. ''The Reserve Officers 
Training Corps has been transformed into the Regular Officers Training 
Corps by the introduction of scholarships and regular commission 
(Powell et al, 1994, p24, original author's emphasis)." John Lehman cites 
several figures to support his contention that the military is becoming 
isloated. He states that military service by civilians over 50 years in age 
l;tolding leadership positions is about 80% while military service among 
their children is less than 10%. Cadets and midshipmen at the Military 
and Naval Academy who are children of career military parents is at a 
record high. "The symptoms are legion. We have created a separate 
military caste (Powell et al, 1994, p24)." 
The debate over the end of conscription in the late 1960s and 
1970s centered around the fear that an all-voluntary military would 
become praetorian or mercenary. There were also arguments that the lack 
of civilian participation would increase public apathy for military affairs, 
leaving the military to make needed decisions. A powerful alliance 
between the military and the defense industry was also predicted to 
develop. A military, under these conditions, would have independent 
professional ideas and political views and would be isolated from, 
resentful of, and suspicious of civilians. It was also projected to become 
less concemed with the ethics of the use of force. (Eitelberg, 1995, p63) 
This debate subsided after the end of conscription in the United States, 
Great Britain, and Canada did not result in an uncontrollable armed 
force. 
43 
The all-volunteer force may again be seen as a problem for the 
United States. Downsizing and disengagement from many areas in the 
United States decreases how well military personnel reflect the 
demographics of the nation. As the army becomes filled with more 
careerists, a military mind set may develop which is at odds with that of 
society. (Segal, 1995, p195) Taken to an extreme, a military that is too 
insular may become myopic, unresponsive, and removed from civil 
priorities and concems. (Mcisaac, 1995, p30) Navy Under Secretary 
Richard Danzig shares this view. A report on his lecture to the U.S. 
Naval Institute summarized his belief that " ... if the Navy doesn't keep up 
with society's changing demographics and ideas, the time may come 
when the Navy is seen as alien and undeserving of moral and financial 
support." (Blazer, 1996) Huntington would argue that a small and 
politically sterile military is the best option for maintaining civilian 
control, however, the present military has been weaned on the Cold War 
and Goldwater-Nichols. It is doubtful that it would retum to political 
isolation when political influence is so important to military survival and 
effectiveness. 
The greatest danger to civil-military relations in the United States 
in the creation of a military that is ideologically distinct from society yet 
politically involved and influential. The body of the armed forces would 
feel threatened or alienated and the leadership would understand how to 
create change in the national govemment. These conditions would make 
the military more willing to force policy decisions to favor military 
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objectives and would feel less constrained by public opinion or need. 
2. Changing Demographics 
Demographics in the United States are changing. Mcisaac, who has 
an extreme view of danger from changing demographics, employs several 
figures to support his argument. He indicates that immigration is 
contributing more to population growth than births, accounting for over 
one-third of the growth from 1980 to 1995. Minority groups make up a 
larger portion of the population. Minorities are 26 percent of the United 
States, up from 12 percent in 1970. Census projections show that this 
will rise to over 30 percent by the year 2000. The aging of the "Baby Boom 
Generation" is also having a strong effect on demographics because of 
the sheer size of this segment of society. Thirteen percent of the 
population are over 65 years of age and the median age in the United 
States is 34 years. These figures were 10 percent and 28 in 1970 and the 
median age is expected to reach 37 by 2010. As a result, more people will 
be drawing from Federal entitlements such as Social Security, veteran's 
benefits, and Medicare, and fewer people will be available to share the 
load of payments needed to keep these programs running. (Mclsaac,1995, 
p23). Though these figures are skewed by changes to c,lefinitions of 
minorties during these periods, the trend shows that changing 
demographics will increase pressure for cuts in military spending. 
Though budgetary pressures from these demographic changes will 
make funding for military programs more difficult, the greater problem 
lies elsewhere. The demographic change that most damages civil-military 
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relations is the growing lack of military experience and knowledge 
amongst civilian leaders. The Baby Boom generation now controls 
positions of power throughout society. They were children of the 1960s 
and include those who avoided the draft, marched in support of peace, 
and derided the military. To many in this generation, military personnel 
were too willing to wage war while politicians and industry leaders were 
the "establishment." The armed forces must interact with those which 
had criticized and attacked the military and now hold important and 
influential positions. 
Where military service used to be a stepping stone to political 
leadership, the avoidance of military service is now a common part of 
many politician's lives. The result goes beyond a sense of mutual distrust 
between military leaders and the civilians that they feel have shirked 
their duty. The lack of military experience among the elites in the 
nations continues to grow and could damage civil-military relations. 
This is a level of unfamiliarity that will only expand in the 
years ahead as more and more baby boomers take charge and 
the all-volunteer military ... produces fewer and fewer veterans 
who will rise to positions of influence. (Eitelberg, 1995, p38) 
The statistics bear out the lack of military experience in our 
government. Only eighteen percent of the men aged 39 to 50 within the 
Clinton administration have had military service compared to over 40 
percent of the general population in this age bracket. The White House 
has only eight percent. Even the news media, normally at odds with the 
military establishment, noted that if you " ... don't know AWOL from 
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AWACS, ... send the White House your resume." (Eitelberg, 1995, p49) 
The media is also made up of a high proportion of those who lack 
military knowledge and who have a negative view of the armed forces. As 
William Kennedy wrote in his book, The Military and the Media: Why The 
Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War, there is an increasing antipathy 
between the military and the press. 
A basic problem ... involves the ignorance and inexperience--
or 'military illiteracy' --of the press, which tends to rely on 
'English, sociology, and political science majors' rather than 
the on people familiar with the intricacies of modem 
warfare. Except for a tiny handful of its members ... the press 
lacks the training, time, and means to make sense of defense 
information. Why then should joumalists utterly ignorant 
and inexperienced in the history, language, organization, 
methods, and technology of the subject they are covering ... be 
permitted to roam about at will and to report without 
effective supervision? (Kennedy, Eitelberg, 1995, p40) 
The distrust between the media and the military germinated and 
grew during the Vietnam War and helped the military decide to politicize 
'its interests. Recently, reporters protested the way in which they were 
controlled during Desert Storm. The military gave them access to only 
what the military wanted them to see. This helped to prevent the "CNN 
effect" from having a negative impact on combat operations and security. 
Control of the press during the war, however, heightened the antagonism 
between the military and the media. This may lead to further tension 
between military and civilian elites. (Eitelberg, 1995, p62) 
The demographic trends in the United States are not expected to 
reverse themselves. The aging population, increasing use if entitlements, 
and high levels of immigration will draw funds away from the armed 
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forces. The leaders in industry, media, and government are becoming less 
and less experienced in military affairs. This can cause military and 
strategic decisions to be voluntarily given to military leaders, making 
them more entangled with politics and reducing civilian control. 
(Eitelberg. 1995, p62) It could also cause growing distrust and 
resentment toward the goveming elites making the military even more 
insular and giving it a sense of persecution and danger. Finally, the 
politicians making policy and defense decisions could become insensitive 
to military problems and funding needs, hurting the effectiveness of the 
armed forces. 
3. Operations Other Than War (OOTW) 
Budget constraints, the lack of an enemy easily understood by the 
American people, and a focus on domestic problems have caused forces 
within government and the armed forces to push for military involvement 
in missions other than those for which it is designed. The military must 
devote a significant amount of time and resources to perform OOTW 
domestically and in support of foreign interests. The debate on whether 
performing these mission degrades military effectiveness is heated. 
Military forces are well organized and equipped to handle varying 
situations. Because of the military's efficiency and its strong devotion to 
national well-being, " ... the tendency for some Americans to actively 
solicit ways for the military to get involved in non-warfighting domestic 
tasks seems to be growing." (Mcisaac, 1995, p31) Missions include 
security patrols in Washington, D.C. and in downtown Chicago housing 
48 
areas, youth training and support programs, and disaster relief. There is 
also a growing law enforcement role for the military. Counter-narcotics 
operations in the Caribbean, security patrols during the riots in Los 
Angeles, and maintenance of refugee collection areas have all been tasks 
assigned to the military. (Desch, 1995, p176) The debate centers on how 
the military is affected by these changes in focus. 
Those on one side of the debate assert that these problems are not 
the responsibility of the armed forces and that they waste resources 
which could and should be used for training and equipment. They also 
believe that it is dangerous for civil-military relations because of the deep 
involvement in politics and local issues required for these missions. 
[T]here is growing fear that domestic and international 
missions of a nonmilitary nature will undermine military 
effectiveness. Second, and more importantly, a growing 
internal focus could undermine civilian control of the 
military. (Desch, 1995, p 176) 
Today's military is more homogenous in thought, more unified in 
actions, more active politically, more accepted in traditionally civilian 
missions, and led by less experienced civilian officials. Intervention, 
which had been deterred by lack of legitimacy, internal competition, and 
political inability is slowly being removed. In these conditions, it is 
dangerous for the military to have a focus on domestic issues rather on 
preparing for an external threat. The military may come to believe that it 
can and should intervene in government to solve domestic problems. 
Opponents of this view argue that the national interest includes 
domestic problems and, thus, the military is a perfect asset for correcting 
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these problems. Public confidence in the armed forces is higher than for 
any other government organization. The people also see the military as a 
stabilizing force during crises or disasters. Some feel that military 
manpower could be used to rebuild inner cities and military personnel 
scould serve as role models. Service in the armed forces is also seen as an 
effective way of instilling citizenship and discipline. They cite successful 
programs such as the Marine Corps' Toys for Tots program, the Personnel 
Excellence Partnership Program, and volunteer efforts by the armed 
forces in communities surrounding military bases. (Gilroy, 1995, p73) 
The military supports the first view and believes that, despite the 
need to " ... make greater efforts to communicate what 'value added' the 
armed forces bring to society (Mcisaac, 1995, p29)," social services should 
not be provided by the military. Resources must be used to maintain 
combat readiness, a task already made difficult by funding cuts. (Gilroy, 
1995, p72) The voluntary nature of many community support programs, 
before the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 made 
these programs possible without reducing the time devoted to military 
matters. Military forces are now officially tasked by this Act to provide 
assistance to civilian groups on matters varying from preserving 
environmental conditions to improving equal opportunity to providing 
training and schooling. (Gilroy, 1995, p74) These programs now detract 
from time spent on strictly military matters. 
As OOTW become more numerous and the number of personnel 
shrink, the operational tempo must increase. Constant or increasing 
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international obligations must compete with 001W for fewer personnel 
and platforms, reducing downtime for the people and the gear. Longer 
deployments, less time with family, and less time for training are the 
resultant drawbacks for military personnel. Equipment is also 
accumulating hours and miles at a higher rate and is thus at a lower 
level of readiness as maintenance schedules tighten. Limited military 
budgets are spent to support missions when other government agencies 
already have responsibility and expertise in a given mission area. 
Domestic goals " ... deserve support up to but not beyond a very clear line. 
This line is crossed when the military's training and thus its budget 
requests for equipment and money are driven by noncombat missions." 
(Cropsey, 1993, Gilroy, 1995, p79) Some argue that the armed forces 
should begin training specifically for such non-traditional missions. If 
this is the case, the assumption can be made that the military is not 
inherently the best organization to be performing these tasks. If training 
is required, therefore, maybe the civilian organizations already assigned 
to solve these problems can be trained instead. 
F. EXTENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY PROBLEMS 
The armed forces are facing many challenges after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Stress from downsizing, reduced budgets, mandated 
personnel changes and changes within society will not subside for many 
years. Demographic changes will continue to set the military apart from 
the population and reduced numbers of service personnel and basing will 
worsen this isolation. Military leaders are more political and more 
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influential while their civilian counterparts are less capable and less 
interested in military matters. Finally, the armed forces may lose combat 
effectiveness as domestic and humanitarian missions grow more 
prevalent. Combined, these changes could lead to inappropriate military 
influence in government and could increase the chances of military 
defeat in the field. 
The ultimate collapse of the U.S. system of civilian supremacy over 
the military, by definition, would be a military seizure of power. Political 
power beyond what is believed to be appropriate may be undesirable, but 
is still within the bounds of our legal system. Excessive influence could 
lead to national policy which is based too much on military ideas and 
perceptions while a coup d'etat would destroy the constitutional system. 
America would no longer be the model of democracy for the world. If a 
coup occurred, even a retum to civilian control would not repair the 
damage as the United States would be forever looking over its shoulder 
for the threat of another coup. 
Few experts expect the civil-military problems facing the nation to 
result in a coup d'etat, but the extreme nature of this event makes it 
important to understand. If, as Kohn argues, one CJCS can override the 
President on important issues, the system is primed for another to do so 
in the future. It is doubtful that military isolation could become as 
serious a problem as some believe it to be. Military personnel maintain 
contact with the community through their civilian family members and 
friends. They often share stronger ties with civilians than they do with 
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fellow members of the armed forces. Additionally, servicemen are also tied 
to the community through marriage and through their children who do 
not live within the constraints of military ideas or bases. These facts can 
help to temper if not alleviate the sense of isolation. 
The problem with the loss of military experience and sympathy 
within the government could be more threatening. Animosity between the 
governing elites and military forces is unhealthy and could make the 
armed forces feel alienated and threatened. This is especially important if 
soldiers and officers sense that their lives or the security of their families 
are threatened by civilian incompetence. With an understanding of 
politics and the lack of ability to influence it favorably by legal means, 
other methods may become attractive. 
There is not a crisis in civil-military affairs, but there is a problem. 
The system has not adapted to the nations's changing military needs and 
world role so tensions between the military and the elites in society are 
growing. A politically oriented and influential military also is becoming 
more homogenous in beliefs. These military beliefs are also increasingly 
distinct from those of the populace. Problems exist and could result in a 
crisis or coup d'etat in the future. The theories on the causes of coups 
d'etat will help to determine if there is a threat of a military intervention. 
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IV. THEORIES ON COUPS D'ETAT 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE COUP D'ETAT 
Military seizure of power would signal the ultimate failure of U.S. 
civil-military relations. In order to understand whether an impending 
crisis in civil-military relations could cause the overthrow of the civilian 
government by the armed forces, we must first understand what a coup 
d'etat consists of and what causes it to occur. 
The Merriam-Webster Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 
defines the coup d'etat as " ... a sudden decisive exercise of force in 
politics ... the violent overthrow or alteration of an existing government by 
a small group" (Merriam-Webster, 1984). A coup d'etat can also be 
defined as the use of violence to displace or supplant an existing regime 
or government. A similar definition of a coup d'etat is taken from the 
seminal work by Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat, A Practical Manual.. He 
states that: 
A coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical 
segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to 
displace the government from its control of the remainder. 
(Luttwak (1968), 1979, p27) 
Luttwak's definition agrees with that of Finer because it explicitly does 
not require mass public support or the use of military type force. More 
specifically a coup d'etat is 
... a swift, precise, operation aimed at displacing the current 
rulers and replacing them with oneself or one's own 
nominees. 
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resulting in the 
... displacement, lock, stock, and barrel, of a ruling 
government and its replacement with something manifestly 
different in composition, complexion and possibly, political 
allegiance. (Ferguson, 1987, p14) 
These definitions set the coup d'etat apart from revolutions, revolts, and 
uprisings. 
Requirements for the instigators of a coup d'etat to use force is the 
factor that makes military involvement prevalent in coups. The soldier is 
now the expert on the use of violence and force and " ... enjoys a near-
monopoly of all effective weapons." (Finer (1962), 1988, p11) In order for 
a coup d'etat to be successful, the planners must either neutralize the 
armed forces or have them as allies. The theoretical studies of coups 
represented by S.E. Finer's The Man on Horseback, Edward Luttwak's 
Coup d'Etat, A Practical Manual, Donald L. Horowitz's Coup Theories and 
Officer Motives, and Gregor Ferguson's Coup d'Etat, A Practical Manual 
each approaches the understanding of the coup d'etat, as a phenomenon, 
by explaining the military's decision to intervene in the political process 
and to displace the government in power. 
The regime of military provenance or direct military rule is, 
in short, a distinctive kind of regime; and the military as an 
independent political force is a distinctive political 
phenomenon. (Finer (1962), 1988, p4) 
The main issue is the possibility that the military in the United States 
would ever stage a coup d'etat. 
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The military must overcome the objective and subjective controls 
that inhibit political intervention if it decides that it should and has the 
ability to attempt a coup. Theories on coups have changed from the 
1950s, when the first postwar coups occurred, through the 1980s. Initial 
theories were focused on the structural differences between a 
professional military and the civilian government under which it was to 
serve. These early theories portrayed the military as forces for 
modernization which were forced to exist within "traditional societies." 
This theory gave way to the institutional level of analysis that sees the 
armed forces as a unified, rational actor which simply fights for its own 
interests. The military is merely defending corporate interests such as 
pay, pensions, budget allocations, and promotions. The final trend in 
explaining coups d'etat viewed the military forces of a nation as 
fragmented or factionalized. Competition between the various groups 
within the military coupled with individual officer motives explains the 
decision to intervene. This involves a cost-benefit analysis by each 
individual officer. (Horowitz, 1980, pp 3-8) 
The changes in theoretical approaches to the explanation of coups 
d'etat are evident in the chronological order of the significant 
publications on the subject. Finer published the first edition of his book 
in 1962. He focuses on the differences between the military and society. 
(Finer (1962), 1988) Horowitz published his text in 1980 and presented 
individual motives of the officers as the key to understanding the coup. 
(Horowitz, 1980) The goal of the remainder of this chapter will be to piece 
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together the most compelling arguments and recognize the factors that 
would be the probable causes of a coup in the United States. The 
execution phase of a coup is believed to be the most difficult stage of a 
coup d'etat. Difficulties involved in execution can either deter an attempt 
or prevent success. 
B. MOTIVES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION 
1. Inhibiting Factors That Must Be Overcome 
As stated earlier, participation in a coup d'etat is an unusual and 
risky undertaking for the participants. Many factors, which would inhibit 
an officer from participation, exist within society. There are, however, 
also factors which make success possible or military forces would never 
chose to intervene. A discussion of these advantages and inhibiting 
factors will provide the needed background for further discussions on 
motives and opportunity for intervention. 
The military enjoys many advantages that give it the assets and 
the command ability to initiate and execute a coup d'etat. It possesses 
superior organization and unity because of its hierarchical structure. 
Actions and orders can be carried out faster and with more unified effort 
than in most civilian organizations. 
Finer traces historical developments which have made the present 
forms of military intervention possible. He notes that the military states 
which existed prior to two hundred years ago were not military 
intervention in the modem sense. There was no political motivation, no 
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separate identity of the armed forces, and there was seldom the search or 
the need for legitimacy. They ru.led by force and subjugation. (Finer 
(1962), 1988, p187) 
Finer lists five factors or variables that have made the modem 
form of military intervention possible. First, the officer corps of the 
armed forces has become professionalized. Though this professionalism 
can inhibit politically motivated actions, it can in tum cause gaps to 
form between the goals of the politicians and the military. The second 
factor is the concept of and growth of nationalism that has placed the 
military in a position of ideological power. The armed forces are seen as 
the protectors of the state and symbols of independence and national 
identity. The third variable is also associated with nationalism. 
Nationalism divorced the ru.ler and the state. They are no longer seen as 
a single entity, so loyalty to the state no longer requires loyalty to the 
ru.ler. 
Popular sovereignty is the fourth variable and was also made 
possible by nationalism. The power to grant legitimacy was· transferred to 
the people and removed from the hands of the kings. Power can be taken 
by whomever gains control of the machinery of govemment because the 
monarch became expendable as a source of power. The emergence of new 
states from colonial ru.le is the final factor that allowed present forms of 
military intervention. As nations emerged, the cleavages of race, religion, 
and class re-emerged and were exacerbated by arbitrary boundaries. 
These cleavages can be tapped as a source of conflict and as motivation 
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to challenge the government. (Finer (1962), 1988, p188) Advantages of 
the military and the nationalist structure make the coup d'etat possible, 
but they do not cause officers to decide to seize power. Even the military 
that wishes to steal political power faces disadvantages that can inhibit 
it from acting. 
The armed forces of a nation are seldom, if ever, qualified to run a 
modem nation-state. Within its own organization, the military is a self-
contained society and is capable of extending this organization to run 
simple societies. It can provide the rudiments of law and order to a 
simple, subsistence, agricultural countiy or a single advanced city and 
keep the people fed. (Finer (1962), 1988, p12) As the society grows more 
complicated and advanced, the military is no longer able to control the 
situation. The services and bureaucracy required to run a metropolitan 
city such as New York would overwhelm the military's resources, though 
this task is vastly easier than the running of the entire United States. 
(Finer (1962), 1988, p12-19) As Attila the Hun taught, you can conquer 
from horseback, but you can't rule from horseback. 
The armed forces also faces the lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population and the restraint of its own professionalism. Historical 
civilian control of the military in nations such as the United States or 
Great Britain has become an almost dogmatic foundation of the culture 
and national identity. Any ruler or ruling group that takes power based 
on strength of force would be continually challenged and forced to prove 
its dominance and right to rule. Professional military officers are 
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normally inward looking. Their main concem is the effectiveness of the 
force. Any effort devoted to political problems would only reduce this 
effectiveness. Politics should be left to the politicians, especially 
conceming policies that have minimal ramifications for the armed forces. 
(Finer (1962), 1988, p20-21) 
Additional inhibiting factors are based upon the armed forces' 
sense of self preservation. Intervention or politicalization could lead to 
factions within the military that in tum would decrease its effectiveness. 
Soldiers and sailors are also averse to firing upon each other if a conflict 
should arise. If the armed forces attempt to intervene and fail, their very 
existence could be threatened. Avoiding these situations is the best way 
to defend the power and unity of the armed forces. (Finer (1962), 1988, 
p26) 
There are also individual inhibiting factors. By deciding to 
participate in a coup d'etat against the civilian regime, the officers are 
consciously deciding to do something that challenges their sense of 
professionalism. The undertaking is illegal, irregular, and unpredictable. 
An overthrow of the govemment may also destroy a system that has 
rewarded the officer for long term service and obedience. There is also no 
going back. Failure of the coup d'etat is very likely and the penalties are 
high. Death is a distinct possibility and there is almost guaranteed loss 
of position. (Horowitz, 1980, xi) 
61 
2. Motives Overcoming Inhibiting Factors 
There must be strong reasons to make a military officer decide to 
participate in a coup d'etat when he is faced with such seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles to success and inhibiting factors. The reasons 
must be compelling enough for each participant to risk everything to 
seize power from the government each had previously served. The 
theories, which have attempted to explain this decision process, differ 
depending upon the level of analysis. The most important motive, 
however, is a sense of danger. Danger can come from external threats, 
impending collapse of the nation, challenges to military corporate 
interests, or from fear of conditions which threaten the individual officer. 
Earliest thoughts on the causes of coups d'etat saw the modernizing 
force of a professionalized armed force conflicting with the backward, 
traditional society. Given the progression of theory away from this idea 
of old versus new, and our concentration on a highly developed society, 
these theories will not be considered. 
The military may see danger to the nation because of the 
incompetence of the civilian government that is failing to provide for 
proper defense from external enemies or to provide internal stability. This 
sense of danger can cause the armed forces as a whole to develop a desire 
to reform the nation. (Ferguson, 1987, p38) The stated reform could be 
to save the nation from a decadent or frivolous government that is 
leading the nation to failure. Reforms can also be attempts to restore the 
reputation of the nation or the spirit of its people. Economic stagnation 
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and hardship can create this desire to create a new order under the 
direction of the military. These desires for change can erupt into active 
opposition to the government if the system frustrates or makes these 
goals unattainable through normal and legal methods (Ferguson, 1987, 
p16). 
A professional military may intervene if it feels that it is the only 
effective protector of the state. The armed forces see themselves as 
servants of the state rather than the government currently in control. In 
the United States, support for the ideas embodied in the Constitution 
would be stronger than any loyalty to the individual currently holding 
the office of President or Secretary of Defense. Military leaders may also 
believe that they are the only ones capable of deciding the structure and 
management of the military and view civilian control as ineffective or as 
interference. This is more pronounced when the civilian input is deemed 
dangerous or irresponsible. If the govemment utilizes the "professional" 
military to enforce domestic policy, the duty to obey civilian authorities 
is placed in conflict with loyalty to the nations population. 
Governments are thus vulnerable to those who are able to take control of 
the key parts of the state machine. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p19-22) 
The military could also see danger in a challenge to its vested 
interests. A grievance may, therefore, serve as a motive. This can be in 
response to humiliation that is correctly or incorrectly attributed to the 
civilians. The military then lashes out at those it feels has wronged it. 
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... an army that is too weak to beat a foreign enemy still has 
ample strength to cow its unarmed domestic antagonists. 
Defeat in war, moreover, is likely to undermine popular 
confidence in the existing government. The army itself-partly 
as a result of the psychological law that links frustration to 
aggression-is tempted to clear its tarnished record by finding 
a civilian scrape-goat. (Zimmerman, 1979, p399) 
A military also may believe that its efforts in the field have been 
undermined and that there is danger to its survival in war. It sees the 
policies or support of the civilians as lacking and responsible for its 
defeats or setbacks. 
Military intervention in politics has also been seen as an attempt 
by the armed forces to defend or improve its corporate interests. In this 
level of analysis, the motives are also attributed to a unitary military, 
but are selfish in nature. Military self preservation can become a motive 
for a coup d'etat if the military's ideas and political thoughts diverge 
from those of the society of the government. (Ferguson, 1987, p18) The 
military officers " ... set out to protect their budgets, their autonomy, their 
promotions, salaries, pensions, and perquisites." (Horowitz, 1980, p6). 
The military may also be composed of a dominant class that differs 
from that of the public or from the civilian leadership. If this dominant 
class feels threatened, neglected, or slighted, it could influence the armed 
forces to intervene in government to correct the situation in a manner 
favorable to the dominant class. (Finer (1962). 1988, p35) The U.S. 
military's officer corps is not made up of a socially, economically, or 
racially distinct part of the population, nor is it threatened by the 
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civilian population. The officers may, however, feel that the population 
does not understand the roles or efforts of the armed forces, but this is 
not caused by class differences. 
Donald Horowitz would argue that there is not a distinct set of 
variables that cause coups to occur. He believes that there has not been 
a theo:ry developed which would explain the decision to intervene, but 
that unpredictable combinations of motives are the cause. In his studies 
of a Ceylonese (Sri Lanka) coup attempt, he found that: 
Personal ambition, career frustration, family rival:ry, 
factional organization, political intrusion into the military 
domain, the officer's social ties, mounting political unrest, 
governmental action on several policy fronts-all of these and 
other matters had a role in moving the Ceylonese officers to 
take up arms. (Horowitz, 1980, p180) 
He noted that the many clefts and factions within the society made the 
coup d'etat easy to initiate but did not serve as a cause. The military 
differences with the civilian leadership also did not bring the officers to 
the decision that it was acceptable or preferable to participate, but did 
lower their thresholds significantly. Though he argues that most factors 
could not have individually caused intervention, the one overriding factor 
was the officer's sense of danger. Each officer's definition of danger and 
the source of this danger differed, but it was this sense of foreboding that 
led them to intervene. (Horowitz, 1980, p187) 
Though many theories exist and each offers many motivates for 
military intervention, a sense of impending danger is the key factor. This 
danger may approach from many directions, such as within the 
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government or society. The source of perceived danger may differ for each 
participant in a coup d'etat, but the sense of danger is universal. 
Military officers may possess motives to intervene in politics and 
thus decide to stage a co1,1p d'etat, but, as noted earlier, are faced with 
obstacles that would prevent success in many situations. For a coup 
d'etat to gain followers and have a chance of success, there must be 
opportunity as well as motive. Theories also differ on what factors or 
events in a nation provide this opportunity. The following section will 
address the factors which could provide the opportunity for military 
intervention in the United States. 
C. OPPORTUNITY FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION 
The opportunity to intervene in politics can be provided by a 
change in the relationship between the civilian leadership and the 
military. These changes can be in the form of increased dependence upon 
the military. A crisis can accentuate this dependence. During a domestic 
crisis the government may call upon the armed forces for support and 
then become reliant on the military. The military may then gain control 
of policy and learn to flex its political muscle. It may then decide that it 
enjoys this power and refuse to give it back to the legitimate government. 
If the military is popular in society and has prestige, there will be less 
opposition to military intervention and there may even be strong 
. support. 
Finer combines the variables of motive and opportunity to predict 
the intervention of the military in politics. His variables of disposition 
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and opportunity, which correspond to motives and opportunity, predict 
intervention as shown in the following table: 
Disposition Opportunity Intervention 
No No No 
Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes Possible* 
Yes No Failed 
* Military may intervene if invited as in Burma in 1958. 1 
Table 1. Variables Leading to Intervention 
Edward Luttwak considers that there is an opportunity to 
intervene in the presence of three variables. These variables are econormc . 
backwardness, political independence, and organic unity. In his theories, 
the absence of these variables makes a successful coup d'etat impossible. 
(Luttwak (1968), 1979, pp32-56) Political independence exists for the 
United States, so it will not be discussed. 
Economic backwardness makes a coup possible because it makes 
the current leadership vulnerable. A citizen of the nation may have a 
minimal understanding of the political system but is powerless to change 
lMary Callahan of the Naval Postgraduate School, National Security Affairs Department, 
has conducted extensive research on Burma and can provide valuable information on this 
particular coup d'etat. 
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the outcome. Political participation is limited to an elite class which is a 
small fraction of the population. The elites are easy to identify and serve 
as the focus for the frustrations of the population. The bureaucracy is 
usually mechanical and unable to adapt to change. Competence and 
technical skill are usually low and the system is unresponsive to the 
needs of the people. Effective local government either does not exist or is 
only able to maintain the status-quo. Power is centralized rather than 
diffused throughout the society so the common man possesses no means 
to voice his opinion or to seek improvement in his surroundings. 
Luttwak says that, though economic backwardness does not guarantee a 
coup will occur, 
It does mean, however, that only the intervention of special 
circumstances will prevent a well-planned coup from 
succeeding in economically backward countries, while only 
exceptional circumstances will allow it to succeed in the 
developed areas. (Luttwak (1968}, 1979, p38) 
Despite the wealth of the United States, some of the conditions 
within Luttwak's definition of economic backwardness exist within our 
society. There is an elite group of wealthy politicians who compete for 
political power among themselves, leaving the average person unable to 
reach these positions. Societal and monetary frustrations are often 
blamed on the politicians and on the inadequacies of the government. 
The bureaucracy, though based strongly on a meritocracy and manned by 
technocrats, is seen as excessively large and unable to respond to the 
needs of the people. Political participation also· continues to drop for 
presidential elections. Although each individual has the right to voice 
68 
opinions through free speech and free press, the ability to make 
meaningful changes as an individual is severely limited. (Berke, 1996, 
pA-ll) 
According to Luttwak, coups d'etat are ineffective unless organic 
unity exists within the power structure of the target state. The power 
base must coexist with the political target. There are many situations 
where the actual power within a nation resided outside the structure of 
political rulership. Large foreign finns or businesses could exert 
significant power such as ARAMCO within Saudi Arabia during the late 
60s and 70s. During this period ARAMCO provided 90 percent of 
government revenues collected in Saudi Arabia and was responsible for 
the development of most of the educational, infrastructure, and medical 
care within the country. The company became a state within a state and 
the government had to make decisions based on the premise of avoiding 
opposition from the company. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p47-48) 
Regions within the nation may also fall under the control of 
powers outside the direct control of the central government. Warlords 
may hold dominion over there own territories. Ethnic blocks may exist 
and regard themselves as independent of the central government. 
Federations with weak central governments, such as the United States in 
the early 1800s, possess no effective center of power for the coup 
planners to seize. The states would simply conduct business-as-usual. A 
coup that seizes power in the political center, therefore, may not affect 
certain regions or upon the large company organization. In effect: 
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The target state must have a political center. If there are 
several centers these must be identifiable and they must be 
politically, rather than ethnically, structured. If the state is 
controlled by a non-politically organized unit, the coup can 
only be carried out with its consent or neutrality. (Luttwak 
(1968), 1979, p55) 
Based on this need for organic unity, the United States' best defenses 
against a successful coup d'etat may be its sheer size and complexity and 
its diffusion of power among fifty states. The state governments, as well 
as their representatives in Washington, D.C., must be cajoled or coerced 
into supporting any coup efforts. (Ferguson, 1987, p49) 
Gregor Ferguson adds to Luttwak's definition of opportunity. 
Unlike Luttwak's economic or political preconditions, Ferguson argues 
that opportunity can actually be created by the instigators of a coup 
d'etat. Propaganda can be used to set up public support for military rule 
so, using Ferguson's definition of opportunity, coup planners can 
consciously create their own opportunity. (Ferguson, 1987, p25) The 
opportunity can also unify military and societal goals. There could be 
fears of foreign attack or the belief that disorder may loom in the future. 
The armed forces and society would, thus, both seek ways of countering 
the threat and be more likely to accept military intervention or rule 
(Horowitz, 1980, p19). 
In conclusion, opportunity for intervention would arise in the 
United States if the public becomes disappointed in civilian leadership 
and the military becomes popular. Further centralization of power and 
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influence within the government and an increasingly unified armed 
forces will support this opportunity by making seizure of the government 
possible. The diffusion of power within the United States, the mingling of 
civilian and military beliefs, and the lack of legitimacy for military 
rulership prevent opportunity from existing. 
D. PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE COUP D'ETAT 2 
The planning and execution phases of a coup d'etat determine the 
success of a coup. Even a military force with strong motives for 
intervention and a very favorable opportunity to stage a coup will not 
succeed if these phases are not carried out with care. The planning and 
execution in the United States are further complicated by the openness 
of the society and the diffusion of political power. Basic strategies will be 
listed and specific application to the United States will be emphasized. 
Coup planners must pursue a strategy that will give the coup 
d'etat the highest possibility of success. This strategy must be based 
upon the idea of speed. "The execution of the coup must be so planned 
that what is won is exactly what is required, no more and no less." 
(Ferguson, 1987, p4 7) The coup is usually attempted by a small force 
relative to the resources available to the target state, although the need 
for simultaneous operation requires a large number of people. (Luttwak 
(1968), 1979, p59) The planners must take control of the machinery of 
2 Detailed discussions of the planning and execution phases of the coup d'etat can be 
found in books on the subject by Luttwak (1979) and Ferguson (1987) listed in the references. 
Only those factors which are significantly different or relevant to the United States are 
discussed in this paper. 
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government and use it to control the state. Any delay while gaining 
control will allow the opposition to organize and lessen the chance of 
presenting the nation with an event that has already occurred. 
Individuals and organizations that have adopted a wait-and-see posture 
are less likely to oppose a completed action. In the United States 
.. .it is necessary to enlist the support of the senators, the 
people they represent and the state governors. No easy task, 
that. (Ferguson, 1987, p49) 
The armed forces that are not recruited must be neutralized before the 
coup and political opposition must be defeated immediately after the 
coup (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p60). 
The defenses of the state must be neutralized before a coup can 
succeed. The changes in the structure of the military and police forces as 
the nation has grown, ease this task. Armies and police forces have 
grown in size to meet the needs of expanding territory and increased 
populations. The armed forces are less uniform by ethnicity, religion, or 
class and are therefore easier to infiltrate. Additionally, the advances in 
technology have increased the firepower and lethality of the individual 
soldier compared to the civilian. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p63) Each 
recruited soldier provides more control and power to the coup planners. 
There are also problems created by the power of the armed forces. 
Resistance to the coup by even a small force of soldiers loyal to the 
government can defeat the coup. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p65) The 
planners must find ways of delaying or neutralizing any response by 
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these loyal forces. Key positions of leadership and technical skill must be 
determined. Personnel with access to vital information and equipment 
are the most important recruits. To decide which soldiers hold these 
positions, the planners must have an intimate understanding of unit 
distribution, the command structure, the technical structure and 
capabilities, and the technical experts required within the units. 
(Luttwak (1968), 1979, p71). Cleavages other than those between the 
officers and the troops, such as tribal, ethnic, or religious differences, 
can be used to the advantage of the planners or at least prevented from 
causing greater opposition. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p77) After the key 
people and divisions are identified, the recruitment process can begin. 
Recruiting is potentially the most hazardous stage of the planning 
process. The state may have an extensive internal security organization 
that has infiltrated the military. Each individual will have personal 
motivation for their decision based upon the perceived advantages and 
future renumerations offered by each possible course of action. To 
minimize risk during the recruitment process, the recruiting duties 
should be assigned to a loyal, yet expendable member of the 
organization. The entire coup will not be jeopardized by the loss of this 
member. 
The planners may have to play upon the desires and fears of each 
possible recruit in order to attain their support. This may require 
creative painting of the picture, but the planners must be aware that 
consistency is vital for credibility. The coup leaders and recruiters should 
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avoid any direct identification with a specific policy, person, or political 
group. This approach will give the opposition a less defined target and no 
issues around which to rally support. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p85) 
Ideally the leader of the coup d'etat or the major planner will be a 
senior officer in the army. If the planners do not have a member who can 
fulfill this role, they must recruit one. The ideal recruit for leadership 
will have attended some form of staff college and have had a major 
command. It is best if he is on active service and commands obedience 
and respect from junior and senior officers. With this training and 
experience, the leader can plan logistics, command and control, 
intelligence, and operational aspects of the coup. (Ferguson, 1987, p63) 
The selected leader of the coup must meet many requirements. 
Their political views must be sympathetic. They must also believe that 
intervention is a more viable altemative to the current govemment. 
Additonally they must be willing to forsake the civilian powers that have 
provided high ranking positions. Additionally, a prime candidate would 
be one who is unsatisfied with current and future advancements and is 
disappointed in the current leadership's abilities. (Ferguson, 1987, p66) 
Based on these characteristics, the prime candidate for leader of a coup 
d'etat in the United States would be a one-star, flag or general officer on 
active duty. He may have a strong desire for power and be ideologically 
opposed to the policies of the civilian leadership. Above all, in the United 
States, the leader must have a strong sense of duty to the country that 
can override his loyalty to the elected govemment. 
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Coup planners should not expend a large amount of effort to 
recruit the police and paramilitary forces. History has proven that no 
paramilitary force has ever mobilized in the defense of the target regime. 
(Luttwak (1968), 1979, p95) The police will likely pursue a wait-and-see 
policy. The coup planners should neutralize the most dangerous 
segments of the police force and deal with them more thoroughly after 
the coup. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p99) 
The security force is a more dangerous adversary. The organization 
is usually smaller, but its ability and mission threaten the secrecy and 
anonymity of the coup and the coup planners. The intemal security 
section of the intelligence community is the key adversary within the 
security organization. Its function is to prevent the overthrow of the 
government. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p100) For the United States this 
function is fulfilled by the FBI. The intelligence organization is, by its 
function, politically aware. The preferred method of dealing with these 
forces is to persuade them to join the coup and aid in the seizure of 
power. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p104) 
Once the coup planners have decided to take power and the 
recruitment and intelligence gathering is underway, the planning must 
shift to tactical matters. The execution phase of the coup d'etat is a 
rapid frenzy of activity that can be compared to a missile strike. All 
decisions must be made prior to the launch and the planners must then 
wait for the outcome. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p146) The entire coup may 
be over in less than one day, and the actual assaults are likely to last 
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only two to six hours. Any time beyond this would increase the chance of 
organized opposition and failure (Ferguson, 1987, p89). 
Finding the best way to take control of the machinery of the state 
will the key to success at this stage. The political forces that may be 
aligned against the coup must be neutralized. Ceremonial figures, 
especially those that lend legitimacy, should be handled gently and 
manipulated as needed to aid the consolidation of control. The inner-
circle of key ministers, bureaucrats, and those in control of the forces of 
coercion should be eliminated or isolated from their organizations. By 
isolating these key officials, their organizations will be operating without 
leadership. There may either be no response to the coup or response too 
slow to make a difference. Lesser officials should be handled after the 
coup. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p117) Personalities outside of government 
who exert considerable influence, such as Ghandi in India, are rare. An 
example in the United States would likely be a sports hero, music star, 
or entertainment figure. The Reverend Jesse Jackson may exert this type 
of unofficial influence. If these personalities exist, they should be 
handled as ceremonial figures. 
Physical facilities that control the flow of information and 
personnel must be used to the advantage of the coup forces or removed 
from the control of opposing forces. Mass media will be the most effective 
means of establishing authority after the coup. Efforts should be 
concentrated on television and radio stations that have an immediate 
impact on public opinion and are the faster means of information 
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distribution. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p119) Cable News Network (CNN) 
facilities and broadcast equipment in Atlanta, Georgia would fall under 
this catego:ry. Printed media is slower and reaches a smaller segment of 
the population. Telecommunications and inter-organizational 
communications must be controlled for defensive purposes. Control of 
these facilities will isolate individual members of the opposition and 
make their response erratic and sluggish. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p120) 
The coup will have more chance for success if it is geographically limited 
in scope because the communications will be easier to cut off or control. 
(Ferguson, 1987, p87) 
Intemet communications will be·the hardest to control or shut off. 
During the 1991 attempted coup in the Soviet Union, the electronic links 
provided by this growing form of communication prevented the 
perpetrators from isolating Moscow. Gloria Duffy, the president of an 
institute which researches intemational peace and security, stated 
It was distressingly easy for them to take hold of the 
broadcasting and print media outlets and squelch the 
information coming through them, but e-mail broke through 
the wall of propaganda immediately. (Perry, 1992, p30) 
Others have proclaimed that, 
From Tiananmen Square to the Persian Gulf ... electronic 
mail coupled with fax technology is influencing the outcome 
of political events. (Perry, 1992, p30) 
Key considerations for would be coup planners is the difficulty in 
isolating such communication. Geoff Sear of the Institute of Global 





... couldn't have stopped it without shutting down their 
entire phone system, which they needed for their own 
purposes. (Peny, 1992, p30) 
Limiting communications via e-mail will require technical knowledge of 
this system. This will place an additional burden on would be coup 
planners. 
Mass transit facilities, such as railroads and airports, can be used 
to move large numbers of opposition forces into positions where they can 
affect the outcome of the coup. Prevention of use of these facilities is 
easier than ensuring their use, and can be accomplished by simply 
blocking a rail or placing a single vehicle on a runway. Control of 
stations and airports also allow the coup forces to freeze the situation 
for a period of time and serve as good visual evidence that the coup 
forces are in control. 
Buildings are difficult to assault and to control so efforts need to 
be concentrated. The seats of power, main administrative nodes, and 
buildings holding symbolic meaning should be targeted if the forces and 
time are sufficient. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, pp122-130) "In America, one 
would naturally seize the Pentagon, the Capitol and the White House." 
(Ferguson, 1987, p86) Symbolic places or buildings that may have other 
value to the instigators are more valuable. Communications facilities 
and nerve-centers of possible opposition forces serve both purposes 
(Ferguson, 1987, p87). 
Political groups must be controlled or neutralized. Extreme and 
unpopular political groups may be left alone. Their actions opposing the 
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coup may gain support for the coup from the majority of the population. 
Religious organizations will require more attention in less developed 
countries where their influence is greatest. The best policy is to isolate 
the church from its constituents. Killing church leaders would ignite 
strong opposition. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p133) Political parties will be 
handled differently, depending on each party's structure. Some will 
simply acquiesce to a fait accompli.(Ferguson, 1987, p50) Insurrectional 
or machine type parties have the ability to agitate the masses, 
assassinate coup leaders, sabotage facilities, or practice syndicated 
agitation opposing the coup. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p137) Parties of this 
type in the United States do not have significant influence. If they grow 
and gain influence, removal of the leadership is usually enough to 
incapacitate these parties. 
The organization that poses the greatest danger to the coup, is the 
trade union. They possess mass followings and have experience in 
political action and agitation. The best policy is to avoid directly 
threatening the trade unions and to avoid violent confrontation if 
possible (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p143). If the union will potentially 
oppose the coup, the leadership should be isolated or neutralized since 
the general union member often is not interested in the political 
struggles of their leadership. (Ferguson, 1987, p50) 
Students are an unpredictable factor. They are portrayed as 
militant, but seldom act aggressively unless their opportunities or 
interests are directly threatened. They are easily led, especially if they are 
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convinced that the new government will act favorably to student ideas. 
Students are not, however, as coherent or organized as other 
organizations within society, such as the trade unions. Their leaders 
may not espouse or know the real feeling or beliefs of their followers. If 
the response of the student organizations is uncertain, it is best to 
isolate the leadership. (Ferguson, 1987, p51) 
Table 2 shows how critical the pre-coup preparations are in 
meeting the challenges of state forces: 
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Police/Security agency personnel Telephone exchange has been seized, 
raise initial alarms and seek to telex cable links have been sabotaged, 
contact their headquarters radio relays are shut off. They must 
therefore send a verbal message. 
Police/security agency HQ verify As above for communications. Some 
the reports and realize the messengers fail to anive as focal traffic 
seriousness of the threat. HQ tries points are gradually occupied. 
to communicate with political 
leadership. 
Political leadership calls for army As above for communications. Some 
and police intervention. units missing from their barracks; 
others refuse to move;others cannot 
move because of technical 
neutralization 
Political leaders begin to realize As above for communications. Only 
the extent of our infiltration of the militaJ:y radio links can be used to 
armed forces and police. Loyalist communicate with loyalist forces. 
troops respond. 
Uninflltrated forces assemble and Many political leaders no longer 
prepare for intervention. They try available; some arrested and some in 
to reach political leadership for a hiding. 
confirmation of their orders. Some 
defect to us, others choose 
neutrality, but some remain under 
the control of the government. 
Loyalist forces move on to capital Airports are closed and landing strips 
city or if already within its area, interdicted. Railways interrupted and 
move in to the city center. trains stopped. City entry points 
controlled by our roadblocks. 
Loyalist forces in capital area are 
then isolated by direct means 
Table 2. The Mechanics of Intervention of the Loyalist Forces 
(Luttwak (1968), 1979, p151, Table 14) 
Operations should also take advantage of holidays and evening 
hours. There will be fewer people to sound the alarm and few people 
prepared to respond. Loss of communications will be less noticeable and 
overall manning of all targets can be expected to be lower. There is less 
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chance of having to resort to force if the opposition is small and 
unprepared. A small number of casualties or no casualties will reflect 
favorably on those who have seized power when the population is made 
aware of events. (Ferguson, 1987, p91) 
The final phase of the coup is to stabilize the situation as rapidly 
as possible. Coup forces must be stabilized to prevent counter-coups and 
loss of control of individual soldiers. Any looting or excess violence will 
cost the coup valuable support from the population. (Luttwak (1968), 
1979, p163) The bureaucracy is the next group to be stabilized. If the 
bureaucracy feels insecure, individuals within it may decide to offer 
resistance either through active opposition or by refusing to allow the 
bureaucracy to operate. Coup leaders should reassure the bureaucracy 
that changes will not have a negative effect on their organization or 
position. Communications should be limited between the 
nonparticipating portions of the armed forces and the bureaucracy to 
prevent the growth of opposition or counter-coups. (Luttwak (1968), 
1979, p166) 
The next task is to stabilize the masses. Coup initiators must gain 
acceptance. The flow of information and people must be frozen or 
manipulated for the benefit of the coup forces. All communication via 
the mass media should show control of the situation rather than 
concentrating on giving justification for the coup. News of opposition 
must be suppressed to lower the risk of bandwagoning to the resistance. 
The political message sent out to the population must be designed to 
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gain the support of allies. An intimate understanding of the political 
situation will allow the coup leaders to tailor their message to gain short 
or long term allies. Which allies are more important to the success of the 
coup is decided by the perceived weaknesses within the coup 
organization. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, pp167-171) 
The final step for a successful coup is to gain legitimacy. The coup 
must overcome the illegal nature of its seizure of power. Heads of state 
serve an important function if they can provide this legitimacy. 
Recognition by foreign powers is important because it can confer 
legitimacy. A negative aspect of foreign recognition is the possible effect 
of making the population believe that the forces behind the coup d'etat 
are controlled by foreign powers. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, 172) Legitimacy 
is also gained by demonstrating the ability to run and lead the nation. 
The new leadership will have to tum the running of the government back 
over to the bureaucracies and civilian administrators. They must also 
correct the problems that they proclaimed were the motivation for the 
coup d'etat in order to prevent themselves from being removed from 
power. (Ferguson, 1987, p193) The distribution of political power and the 
pervasiveness of information make it impossible for the initiators of a 
coup d'etat to gain legitimacy after the fact. It is more likely that the 
military has already gained acceptance and popularity prior to any 
decision to intervene. 
The minimal goal that is acceptable is a restoration of stability. 
This goal is made difficult by the problem of precedence. 
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A major problem facing any country which has suffered a 
coup d'etat is that of precedence; it has happened once, it 
can happen again. A coup weakens the political institutions 
to a greater degree than any internecine strife in the civilian 
sector may have done before; it makes military rule a more or 
less acceptable norm ... The politization of the military 
presents an enormous problem in the aftermath of a coup. 
Once an intelligent officer sees for himself how the country 
is run ... he is in a position to make value judgments on the 
performance of the civilian government ... The unique master-
servant relationship between government and military has 
been destroyed ... (Ferguson, 1987, p 194) 
Military officers in the United States should understand the dire 
consequences of a coup d'etat and make all efforts to prevent the 
creation of conditions that cou-ld encourage intervention. They should 
also have a general understanding of the mechanics of a coup to respond 




The following sto:ry is about an attempted coup d'etat which occurs 
in the United States at an undefined time in the future. It will draw on 
aspects of the Dunlap article and the movie, Seven Days in May 
(Paramount, 1964) This scenario is meant to be explicitly an academic 
exercise with two goals. The first goal is to bring together the theories on 
coups d'etat and civil-milita:ry relations and place them in a familiar 
setting. The second goal arises from the successful accomplishment of 
the first goal. It is to create a viable if not necessarily believable scenario 
of a coup d'etat in the United States to serve as a polemic. Hopefully, the 
coup d'etat, as a phenomenon, will seem less relegated to small nations 
or inexperienced governments in far off, third-world countries and, 
therefore, become a more immediate problem. 
This thesis and scenario does not argue that a coup d'etat in the 
United States will occur in the future or that it is probable. It does, 
however, argue the possibility of this event in any nation which has a 
professional milita:ry. Any reaction by milita:ry leaders or academic 
experts towards the scenario, negative or positive, is success for this 
effort because it will engender greater study and discussion. 
85 
B. CASSANDRA'S CURSE 
1. Setup 
On Superbowl Sunday the United States ceased to exist. As the 
years rolled by, those who wished to assess responsibility blamed two 
men. Most would blame General Michael Alexander Drake, U.S. Army, 
but a few, especially scholars, blamed Thomas Jefferson. Lieutenant (LT) 
Casey Richardson knew better because he prevented the first attempted 
coup d'etat. Though he was able to stop this coup, the example had been 
set, and others would follow. His story is presented below to help others 
decide who caused the end of the United States. 
2. Story 
He really wants to watch the game, even more than the previous 
year, because his favorite team was back in the big game. His San 
Francisco Forty-Niners would be playing the Nashville Oilers despite 
some unpopular realignments of the American Football Conference (AFC) 
and the National Football Conference (NFC). Today, however, is a duty 
day and he had a tough day ahead of him. He is assigned as the Deputy 
Commander of the Joint Law Enforcement Assistance Detachment 
(JLEAD) in Washington, D.C. with a force of 200 enlisted service 
members. His Commanding Officer is Major Lany Waybill. The Major is a 
graduate from the Military Academy at West Point, so they have had a 
few good-natured arguments about their alma maters. Both the Naval 
Academy and West Point had little to brag about during football season. 
It seems that nothing changes, at least in football. 
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A junior officer has to by hard to avoid running into graduates 
from the academies these days. It seems to LT Richardson that they were 
the only schools which commissioned officers anymore. Though it is 
comfortable to serve with people with similar backgrounds and 
educations, he remembers one of his professors back at the Naval 
Postgraduate School had mentioned his displeasure about the lack of 
officers from schools other than the militru:y academies in Colorado 
Springs, West Point, and Annapolis. The reason now sits as a gray cloud 
in the back of his mind, but he brushes it aside and went to work. 
The first meeting for the day would be with the Section Duty 
Officer of the Washington, D.C. police department. Jim Talmadge, the 
police captain in charge of this duty section, would be late as usual, but 
Casey planned to be on time. There was nowhere else where leadership by 
example was needed more and he could read the paper while he waited. 
Soon, he wouldn't have to wait for public officials or union 
workers to show up when they pleased or perform poorly without fear of 
reprisal. General Drake, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), had authorized an extensive advertising effort by the armed 
forces in support of the legislation known as the Militru:y Assistance 
Domestic Autonomy (MADA) Law. The law would give militru:y 
commanders assigned to law enforcement, disaster relief, urban renewal, 
and medical aid programs the authority to fire and hire all civilian 
employees of the city or state organization that was receiving help. 
Expediency and efficiency was expected to improve dramatically within 
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the first year. The General's public relations efforts had been designed to 
head off expected opposition from the unions. The unions decided to 
offer only token resistance and symbolic public announcements. They 
knew the public support for the MADA Law would be strong and the 
unions had other issues to handle. Casey could see that Jim was not 
happy about this outcome. 
"Momin, Lieutenant." 
"Momin, Mr. Talmadge, how are Michelle and the kids?" 
"Oh, Michelle and Jim Jr, are fine but little Mike has a cold. I 
guess children just have to keep you busy or they aren't doing their job, 
huh?" 
"I suppose, but I don't want to say too much since Jessie and I 
don't have any of our own." 
"Well, Lieutenant, I read the paper this moming. I guess you guys 
got that law passed. Can't say I like it ve:ry much. I understand that the 
milita:ry has to run a lot of things nowadays, but I didn't put inl9 years 
to be ordered around by some snot-nosed J.O. (Junior Officer). I have 
nothing against you personally, you've been professional and I see you as 
a friend. I know Michelle enjoys having you over for dinner. Its just that 
they aren't all like you. Some of your buddies can be real pains in the ole 
hiney," he says with an insincere look of pain on his face. 
"Look Jim. We didn't do it to boss anyone around. We had to. The 
reason we picked up all these jobs was because the people who should 
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have been doing them were wasting time and money. We want to solve 
these problems and get back to our own business." 
"And leave these 'shore' jobs and go back to sea or jump around in 
the dirt?" he asks With some genuine disbelief. 
"Yea, Jim, believe it or not, we joined the military to do just that! 
Well, maybe not the worst of the stuff about deployments, but to get out 
there and defend this country. Anyway, I know the new law Will get us 
out of your backyard sooner than later." 
"I hope you're right Casey," Jim says, shaking his head slowly. 
"Anyway, here's the news from last night. There were three muggings, one 
on M-Street in the southeast section, and two on 14th Street. Not much 
new there. All the Witnesses gave different accounts. I passed their 
statements on to your intelligence guys already. There was a shooting on 
the Beltway near the Rockcreek Parkway exit. No clues yet on that one. 
And, finally, the two radio vans showed up on the mall last night. The 
patrol officers didn't know anything about it, but they called your office 
and Major Waybill authorized them to be parked there for the exercise. 
Anyway, it was a relatively quiet night except for the muggings. Anything 
forme?" 
"No, that should cover it. I saw the paperwork on the muggings. 
When Will people learn not to walk around outside the protected areas? I 
suppose it's time to have my people put together another public service 
announcement." Casey hides his doubts well and tries to ask the next 
question in a casual manner. He doesn't want Jim to think that there 
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was any break in the information flow in this command. ''These trucks 
you mentioned, why did they need permission from the Major to park 
near the mall?" 
"It's no big deal really, it's just that the Parks and Recreation 
people normally like keeping the streets near the capital open so that 
tourists can get around. Why?" 
"Oh, I forgot they were going to park there, must have slipped my 
mind," he shrugs. "Anything else Jim?" 
"Nothing right now." 
"O.K., I'll be checking out some of our community relations posts 
today, so if you want to reach me, use e-mail. I'll have my cellular 
modem tumed on. If not, I'll see you at this evening's debrief." 
"See you then Casey," Jim says as he gathers his papers and 
stands up. 
"Sure, and thanks Jim." Casey stands and adds, "Don't worry 
about the new law. I'm sure it will help more than it will hurt." 
''I'll by not to Casey. Later." 
Casey steps out of the detachment headquarters into another frigid 
winter day. His breath creates great big clouds in the air. He had never 
outgrown a childhood fascination with watching the clouds form, take 
on their own distinct shape and then vanish into the air. He adjusts the 
collar on his overcoat and heads to his car. There are twelve joint force 
security stations he wants to visit before the end of the day and now he 
can add the new goal of visiting the communications vans, which are 
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really just green trucks with radio gear in the back. 
He couldn't recall the Major mentioning the need for extra 
communications during the exercise. Still, it wasn't like Larry to forget 
something like that. Ever since Larry had taken command of the 
detachment under those strange circumstances he had proven himself to 
be a outstanding officer. He was charismatic and intelligent and it was 
impossible to deny his love of country or sense of duty. As with all good 
officers, he made sure that information flowed up and down the chain-
of-command. That's what made it weird. Casey thinks to himself, "Maybe 
the extra responsibility of running the exercise made him forget to tell 
me." 
Casey drives into the immaculate parking lot of Post Number 3. 
That is one reason public support for the Joint Forces is so strong. They 
can look outside and see the graffiti and trash in their communities and 
compare it to the clean and groomed areas under military control. There 
are no drug addicts or gangs in the armed forces and the enlisted 
personnel have more drive and training than the average civilian. Many 
civilian families have children who are out of control and lack any kind 
of respect for authority. 
"Still," he thinks, "it hasn't prevented the Congress from reducing 
retirement benefits and health care for military dependents. The mighty 
dollar is always right." He hadn't contributed to the multi-trillion dollar 
deficit in the late nineties which caused the budget reduction legislation. 
Unfortunately, in order to get the law passed, concessions had to be 
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made to the senior citizens by protecting social security and medicare 
benefits. Therefore, the target for cuts became the i.nilitary budget. Now 
over 40 percent of the already limited budget was devoted to OOTW and 
domestic programs. His guys had been complaining about how their own 
families had to take advantage of the aid programs run by the military. 
They asked him several times why the government couldn't just pay the 
soldiers and sailors more. They were serving their nation and providing 
services, yet to feed their kids, they couldn't save for the future. Sergeant 
Sean Petrie is one of these servicemen. 
"Good Morning, Sergeant, how are things this morning?" 
''Things are good this morning and you look real cold L.T." the 
sergeant exclaimed. He likes Casey as much as guy can really like an 
officer and enjoys duty days with him. Things are usually calm and 
controlled. "L.T., there's nothing going on this morning. We have some 
buddies who are willing to call us whenever there is a score in the game. 
I think your Forty-Niners are infor good fight." 
"I think they'll do fine, Sergeant Petrie. Its not like when your 
Georgia Bulldogs meet Tennessee in the SEC (Southeastern Conference), 
the Niners actually have a chance of winning," he jokes, knowing that he 
is pushing a button. 
"Oh L.T., why did you have to say something like that. I actually 
thought you were cool," the sergeant shoots back, laughing. "By the way, 
why are we going to have live tear gas canisters for the exercise? Last 
time we did that, it cost us over $500 because we accidentally set some 
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canisters off. It is cool, though, how you and the Major got us those 
Tasers. We've wanted those for our patrols for forever." The sergeant 
understands how the high voltage stun guns would allow someone to 
take down a criminal without getting close. Though less important to 
those on actual patrol but ve:ry important to lawyers, the criminal could 
also be taken down without using too much force. 
Again, Casey is jarred. He is not used to finding out information 
from second hand sources and is getting upset. He keeps his demeanor 
calm and tries to get a bit more data. "Sarge, when did the Tasers come 
in anyway? I though it would take longer." 
"I think it was yesterday. The guys from the special 
communications team brought them up from Fort Myer." 
''Thanks. Have you heard from the Major today?" 
"No L.T. I sure haven't. I bet he's getting ready for the exercise." 
"Yea, you are probably right." 
Casey read the daily log in silence. Something is a bit strange 
about this rooming's exercise. It was designed to see how the standby 
security team would respond to demonstrators trying to impede the 
President on his rooming jog. "Why would they need tear gas or Tasers?" 
he asks himself. "More importantly, why was this info not passed to me?" 
Casey decides that it is probably to test him to see how the duty officer 
would react. If so, it was a good idea, but it was poorly implemented. He 
should not have known about the whole exercise, if the Major had 
wanted it to be a surprise. 
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The pensive Lieutenant finishes his work, briefs the Sergeant and 
his two assistants, ·and steps back outside. He sighs a big breath cloud 
and watches it disappear. He decides at this point to make his next stop 
the communications trucks. 
The communications vans are parked back-to-back to ease access 
from one to the other. Each is designed to provide a centralized 
communications headquarters for battalion commanders. The exercise is 
for a platoon sized team. Casey realizes there is something strange going 
on, but he can't make his thoughts coherent. There is a conclusion 
which seems to float around the comers of his mind, never distinct yet 
unavoidable. With a deep breath to gather himself, he strides toward the 
trucks. "O.K. Casey, play it cool and get some facts," he instructs 
himself. Three raps on the right-hand truck are greeted by an open door 
and a face. The face belonged to a young man of about 20 years of age 
who was eager to close the door against the cold. 
"Yes, sir?" he inquires of the Lieutenant while rubbing his 
ungloved hands together. 
"I came by to see how everything was going. Lets take a look 
inside." 
The soldier glances quickly behind him into the trailer and 
reluctantly lets the Lieutenant inside. "Sure, sir, come on in," he 
responds to avoid any hassle. 
Casey looks around and sees that everything is running properly, 
but there are no visual cues to help him understand what was happening 
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with the Major. It would require some conversations. "Corporal Jenkins," 
Casey reads off the soldier's name tag, "are you ready for this afternoon? 
It is going to be a big one." 
The corporal hesitates for a moment and then responds, "I think 
everything will go fine. It's about time someone actually took charge and 
fixed this country." 
Casey is stunned. The question had been designed to see if the 
exercise was going to test him as well as the response team. The answer 
almost refuses to register in his mind, but he forces it into focus. He 
really has to play it cool now. "Are you and the others all clear on the 
plans?" 
"Yes sir, the Major briefed us really well. Why, did you miss the 
brief sir? We made some minor changes," the corporal asks as a twinge of 
doubt enters his mind about the Lieutenant's involvement in the plans. 
Casey knows his answer must be believable and calm to avoid 
letting the Sergeant know that he is not really part of the plan. "I had to 
make sure the Tasers arrived on time. Major Waybill and I talked about 
the changes before the meeting." He sees the doubt fade from the face of 
the conspirator even as apprehension grows in his own mind. "I need an 
excuse to stay out of the cold for a little while," he adds as he sits down 
in one of the console seats and removes his gloves. "Let's go over the 
plans one moretime." Casey stretches and runs his hands though his 
hair while waiting for response. 
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"Man, you are just like the Major. He loves repetition and practice, 
practice, practice. Here's the whole shebang one more time. It's not like I 
didn't have this memorized after the tenth time," he adds with a feigned 
look of frustration. He makes a small effort to cover the pride he feels 
because of his mastery of the plan. 'The Air Force recruiting commercial 
during the pre-game show will be the signal for our team to secure the 
President with mini.J:p.al force. Once we have the President under our 
control, we will signal, from here, the rest of our teams in the Pentagon, 
Fort Myer, Andrews (Air Force Base), Langley, Fort Meade, Fort Belvoir, 
and Bolling Air Force Base. These teams will shut down the Beltway and 
cut all land communications lines using prepositioned guys. They will 
also pass on the 'go' signal to the rest of our troops throughout the 
nation. Two minutes after halftime, if everything is going well, the 
General will make an announcement to CNN and to all TV viewers, 
stating our actions and intentions," he recited. "So, did I cover the big 
points, LT?" asks Jenkins, knowing that he had. 
Casey makes a mental note of all Jenkins had just told him. He 
realizes that he has been dropped into the middle of a plot. He is 
involved in the initiating event for a military takeover of the United 
States and the kidnapping of the President. He has always been calm 
under pressure, but his composure is facing its greatest challenge. He 
knows that there is only one thing to do and that there is only a few 
hours for him to do it. "Corporal Jenkins, it looks like you have your 
part under control. It wi~l be good to know that you will be on our side," 
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Casey lies. The newly focused and determined Lieutenant replaces his 
winter clothes and steps back into the frigid moming. 
The obfuscated thoughts now emerge into the bright light of 
realization. He sits with the car engine running, gathering himself for 
the upcoming task. He knows. he doesn't have the time to find out who 
he can trust or how far the conspiracy spreads. It is obvious that there 
are at least supporters of this plot in all the key areas around the 
Capital. He also knows that Major Waybill eventually will realize that 
Casey knows what is going on. The corporal would let it slip. He drives 
toward the parking lot to the northwest of the Washington Monument, 
where the Major would be coordinating the exercise with the response 
team. Now the reasons behind the Major's recent inflexibility on 
transfers into the response team become clear. This team must be his 
selected people. This would make things difficult and dangerous. 
As Casey drives up to the briefing trailer to confront the man who 
he had believed to be a friend, the team tums to identify the approaching 
car. The Major steps out of the trailer to great him. "Casey! What brings 
you here?" he asks as he puts on his field jacket. 
"He still called me by name and doesn't seem upset, so he must 
not know yet," thought the Lieutenant. He can't bring himself to 
continue calling him Larry though. "Major Waybill, top of the moming to 
you," Casey answers in as cheerful a tone as he can muster. There is no 
need to let the Major know anything until he can get move away from the 
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response team. "I have some news for you if you have a moment. It is 
kind of private though." 
The Major barely pauses. "Sure Casey, let's take a walk towards the 
Vietnam Memorial. I have some time." He puts his hands across Casey's 
shoulders. "You look cold and worried. Is it bad news?" 
"Yes, it is. The worst I've ever heard. I just couldn't talk about it in 
front of the men." 
"It's all right. What's the news?" 
Casey waits until they are out of sight from the trailer. "Major 
Waybill, Lany, I know what's going on with the President and I don't 
understand." The Major has a sidearm like Casey, but neither chooses to 
draw them despite the instant fear, anger, and doubt the other feels in 
the presence of the other man. "Please don't do this," Casey asks 
hopefully. 
"Casey, I didn't want you to know because I knew you wouldn't 
understand. I can't let you stop us though," the Major states as he 
moves his hand unconsciously toward his pistol. 
''Try to make me understand, Major." Casey purposely uses rank to 
address his commanding officer to remind him subtly of his duty. "Make 
me understand," he demands. 
"Casey, I don't have time and you are getting in my way. I don't 
want to have to shoot a fellow officer, but I will," the Major warns with 
barely restrained aggression. 
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"Well you are going to have to, MAJOR." Casey draws his sidearm, 
which, unlike the Major's, was already loose in its holster. "Unless you 
want to either explain why two officers killed each other on the mall or 
have the news people reporting our attempts to kill each other, you had 
better start talking to me. It can't be good to have the leader of the point 
team involved in this type of situation this close to when your conspiracy 
is supposed to start." 
"Look, Lieutenant, don't you see where this country is headed?" 
the Major implores. He knows he cannot afford to be in a shooting or a 
struggle. There are too many people around, even for a Superbowl 
Sunday. Already tourists and workers are whispering and walking away 
rapidly. 'The government has shut down for over three times for over four 
weeks each time because of budget issues for the past four years. The 
budget they actually pass is useless. We, me and you, the military, have 
to run almost all the programs for the poor or elderly and yet our men 
haven't gotten a raise in eight years. Not only that, they took away all 
our medical benefits. You can't tell me that its been easy having to send 
our guys to managed health care." 
"So you're saying that you want to give up democracy because of 
money?" Casey asks with disgust. 
"No! That's just an indication that the politicians and the 
bureaucracy are ineffective. Its a symptom of a disease. The only place 
where it is safe to walk at night is where the Joint Forces have control. 
Race riots were spreading like wildfire until we were called in to help 
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enforce peace. We even have to control illegal immigration. I don't know 
about you Casey, but I can't stand to see our guys killed fighting illegal 
immigrant smugglers. The numbers tell the story better than anything 
else. Nobody votes anymore and those who do can't make any difference 
anyway. The civilian leaders have gotten rich and out of touch. They 
think the solution to all our problems to have the military do the job. So 
why pay the civilians who are supposed to be doing these jobs? If they 
want us in charge, then we will take charge." 
"You think by taking over the government, you can make it all 
better?" Casey asks, not hiding his skepticism. "You will probably destroy 
the only thing that can actually make an improvement, popular 
representation. You should know the history of authoritarian countries 
in the west. They don't work. The people, our people, our families would 
never allow or condone it." 
"I think they would Casey. We provide security and stability in 
what has become a mess of a society. We are the only ones who can keep 
this country running and together. When we got torn up trying to defend 
Saudi Arabia because the President and Congress wouldn't send in 
troops, the public screamed for more defense money. They saw who was 
at fault." 
"You and whoever you are working for are arrogant and stupid," 
Casey shot back. "Not everyone feels that the country has lost the ability 
to excel or that it is falling apart. Even if it is, we cannot have a 
government where the guy who controls the most guns makes the rules. 
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We might as well have warlords or something. You think the next guy 
will like the policies that you will come up with? There will always be 
someone who's unhappy and wants to take over. Do you want your kids 
to go through life in that kind of chaos?" 
"Casey, I've thought through this and made up my mind months 
ago. I don't see any other way to do it. The general population is too 
wrapped up in their own near sighted problems and don't understand the 
dangers that face this country. As uninformed and inept as they are, we 
still have to protect them. Besides, General Drake has promised to 
retum power to the elected government after we've taken care of 
protecting our oil supply and giving back these non-military missions." 
Casey waved his gun to direct the Major toward his car. "You are 
gravely deluded. Major Waybill, I am arresting you for sedition and 
treason. I need you to ... , " Casey never finishes the sentence. 
Major Waybill spins around and lunges for the gun. Casey shoots 
twice, hitting the Major in the left thigh and upper arm. Casey drags him 
into the open and runs back to his car. Without stopping to see if the 
response team had spotted him, he speeds off toward the 
communications vans. The Major is unconscious and losing blood, but 
Casey has a more pressing problem. There are already bystanders helping 
the Major anyway. He works himself out of his blood stained overcoat 
during the drive and slows as he approaches the trucks. He doesn't want 
to draw too much attention to his arrival. He hides the gun in his belt 
and knocks on the door. The clouds of his breath come in rapidly forming 
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plumes. The door opens and he pushes his way inside. He takes aim and 
punches the watchstander in the chin, sending him flying into the 
second watchstander. Casey takes out his gun and, using it as a club 
finishes knocking them out. He pulls out all the fuses he can find and 
pours a thermos of coffee he finds over the computers. He then smashes 
everything he can with the thermos and conceals his gun again. He was 
lucky that he didn't have to fire it. A very real effort is needed to slow his 
breathing. There is one more truck to take care of. 
The knock brings a reassuringly familiar response. As the door 
opens Casey collects himself and propels himself and the unprepared 
soldier into the back of the truck. This time he is not as lucky. The 
second watchstander is seated too far away for Casey to reach him. 
"NO!" Casey screams as the young sailor reaches for the radio 
handset. Unfortunately he doesn't stop. Casey retrieves his pistol, swings 
it up, and fires. The soldier he had knocked over begins to struggle until 
Casey sits back and points the pistol toward him, shaking his head. The 
soldier understands and doesn't move. Casey looks up at the sailor, 
slumped in his chair. It would take all three of them a long time to get 
over the fright of last few seconds. The sailor is terrified by the thought 
that he could have been shot. The bullet hole in the roof of the truck lets 
in a beam of sunlight which illuminates the American Flag on the 
soldier's jacket. 
As the pre-game show winds down, the President, who has finished 
his shower, is preparing to watch the football game. He wants to practice 
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what he is planning to say to the winning team when he calls them after 
the game. A harried looking man bursts into the room. 
"Mr. President," the National Security Advisor says to get the 
President's attention. "I just received a report that there was an 
attempted coup d'etat. General Drake is under arrest and we are tiying to 
determine the extent of the plot. I think you will be safe here. The secret 
service and the FBI have secured the area. I don't know all the 
information yet, but my people are on it." 
The President is dumbfounded. He never considered the U.S. 
military capable of committing such an act. Though he had not served in 
the military or been close to anyone who had, he thought he understood 
the military mind. They seemed happy and had plenty to keep them busy. 
He wonders why they had chosen this path. "How did we find out about 
this plot and how close was it to succeeding?" he asks as the agitation 
builds in his voice. 
"Sir, I have only been briefed on the reports of one witness. He says 
it was a widespread plot, but I don't believe him sir. I would not believe 
that more than just a handful of people in the armed forces would 




The United States has become the model for civil-military relations 
by default as other nations falter in maintaining civilian control over 
their armed forces. We continue to offer our system as a model 
throughout the world through programs like the Intemational Military 
Education and Training (IMET) Program and at institutions such as the 
Naval Postgraduate School. Though it is true that the United States has 
enjoyed military success and continued civilian control of the armed 
forces, some, like Weigley, argue that this has been due more to luck 
than to systemic excellence. A historical review of U.S. civil-military 
relations shows that the present military requirements do not conform 
with the aspirations of the American public. A nation traditionally wary 
of large or standing militaries was forced into a world leadership role 
after the Second World War and acquired extensive military needs. The 
original system of civil-military relations is strained by the new 
conditions. There are many who argue that there is a crisis in civil-
military relations. 
This thesis argues that there is not a crisis in U.S. civil-military 
relations if a crisis is defined as direct military challenge to civilian 
authority. Problems that exist result from the changing world 
environment that forced the United States into its present role as a 
superpower. This role was not envisioned or planned for by the founders 
of the United States so the present system of civil-military relations no 
longer meets the needs of the nation. A professional military drawn into 
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political activism by the security needs of the nation and its own 
corporate interests has become separated from the political, civilian 
leadership. The soldier-statesman and citizen-soldier does not exist in 
the form as it was 200 years ago and there will be continuing conflict 
between the milita.Iy and the civilians over national policy and security 
issues as perceptions and goals diverge. With proper study and attention, 
these changes can be adjusted for in our civil-military relations without 
the loss of civilian control. 
The tension between the armed forces and the civilian government 
will almost certainly not result in a coup d'etat in the United States. 
Political participation and public discourse are viable and preferable 
options for those who chose to change the existing system. Most milita.Iy 
officers also have strong ties to society via family and friends, thus 
alleviating some of the isolation and distinctiveness that could separate 
the military from society. The coup would be the most direct and distinct 
form of challenge to civilian supremacy. It would be unwise, therefore, to 
ignore the possibility because of the devastating results such an 
occurrence would have on our system of government. 
There are two issues that should be more carefully researched since 
they would be the most likely causes of a coup d'etat in the United 
States. The first issue is to determine factors that would cause the U.S. 
military to become further isolated from mainstream society in thought 
but more powerful in political and domestic influence. The second issue 
is to understand the conditions that could create a sense of danger 
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within the U.S. military. 
Further understanding of these two issues will allow the educated 
and effective creation· of a new system of civil-military relations. A more 
effective system will make the possibility of a coup d'etat, or any other 
form of military intervention, even less probable. Finally, a revised 
system of civil-military relations can lessen the conflicts between civilian 
and military leadership and thus increase effectiveness of defense and 
national security planning. 
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